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Can Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? 
Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences 
JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI, ANDREW J. WISTRICH & CHRIS GUTHRIE* 
In a series of studies involving over six hundred trial judges in three countries, 
we demonstrate that trial judges’ civil damage awards and criminal sentences are 
subject to influences that make them erratic. We found that the presence of 
misleading numeric reference points (or “anchors”) affected judges’ decisions in a 
series of hypothetical cases. Specifically, judges imposed shorter sentences when 
assigning sentences in months rather than in years; awarded higher amounts of 
compensatory damages when informed of a cap on damage awards; imposed 
different sentences depending upon the sequence in which criminal cases were 
presented to them; and were influenced by a plaintiff’s reference to a damage award 
seen on a “court TV show.” Taken together, the results suggest that unless judges 
take steps to reduce their susceptibility to anchors, their awards and sentences are 
apt to be highly unreliable. We also suggest how judges can safeguard against these 
influences and assign more stable awards and sentences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How many words, on average, did law review articles published in 2012 contain? 
Before you answer, was it more or less than 11,432,839 words? The word count in 
law reviews is high, but that is a ridiculous estimate. Even though a correct, 
objectively determinable answer exists, and 11,432,839 is a ridiculously high 
estimate, contemplating that ridiculously high reference point is apt to influence 
estimates of the actual word count. Psychologists refer to the reliance on numeric 
reference points as a means of making a numeric judgment as “anchoring and 
adjustment,” or simply “anchoring.”1 Anchoring exerts a powerful effect on  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Rachlinski is a Professor of Law at Cornell Law School; Wistrich is a Magistrate 
Judge in the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Guthrie is Dean 
and John Wade-Kent Syverud Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School. 
 1. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974) (describing anchoring). 
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judgment.2 Even though legal scholars are well aware of the length of articles, in 
particular the cap of 25,000 words that many law reviews have adopted,3 first 
contemplating a ridiculously high anchor is apt to influence their estimates. 
Estimating the average length of law review articles is just a parlor game for legal 
academics, but many numeric estimates have important consequences. Numbers 
abound in civil and criminal cases. Losing defendants pay money or serve time in 
prison. Sometimes expressing the outcome of a case in dollars or months is a 
straightforward undertaking, such as when damage awards or sentences are highly 
constrained.4 But judgment is often required to measure damages and impose 
sentences, and cognitive illusions can systematically skew numeric outcomes.5 In 
particular, such judgments are susceptible to distortions from anchoring and related 
phenomena.6 Our experiments reveal that anchoring exerts a powerful influence on 
judicial decisions in hypothetical cases across a wide variety of legal contexts. We 
also find that anchors can arise in subtle and unexpected ways. Our results suggest 
that anchoring is so persistent, unexpected, and widespread that the process of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS 23–38 (rev. & expanded ed., 2009) (describing the influence of anchoring). 
 3. Many law reviews now state a preference for articles under 25,000 words. See, e.g., 
Submissions: How To Submit, HARV. L. REV., http://www.harvardlawreview.org/submissions.php. 
 4. Criminal sentences imposed using sentencing guidelines are often tightly constrained, 
as is the case with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES 
MANUAL (2014). Awards for medical expenses, lost wages, or the cost of covering undelivered 
consideration in contract can also be relatively uncomplicated relative to nonpecuniary losses. 
See DAVID BALL, DAVID BALL ON DAMAGES: A PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY’S GUIDE FOR 
PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH CASES 27 (1st ed. 2001) (“Intangible damages are 
hard to get partly because . . . jurors do not know how to figure out how much to give. . . . 
Jurors have less trouble calculating and giving tangible damages . . . [such as] medical 
expenses and lost wages, and the amounts can be easily determined.”); Adam G. Winters, 
Comment, Where There’s Smoke, Is There Fire? An Empirical Analysis of the Tort “Crisis” 
in Illinois, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1347, 1349–50 (2007) (“‘[E]conomic’ damages . . . can be 
loosely described as any loss that comes with a ‘price tag’ or is easily calculable. Losses 
considered ‘economic’ include past lost wages due to injury and medical bills, as well as future 
lost wages and medical expenses. . . . The complimentary piece of the compensatory scheme 
is collectively labeled ‘noneconomic’ damages. These damages are more difficult to quantify, 
because there is no underlying bill, record, or pay stub on which to base them. Noneconomic 
losses include ‘pain and suffering.’” (footnotes omitted)). Some statutes specify a particular 
amount of damages per violation. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) (2012) (authorizing “an 
action to recover for actual monetary loss . . . or to receive $500 in damages for each such 
violation, whichever is greater”); 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2)(A) (2012) (authorizing “actual 
damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day 
of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher”). 
 5. See Valerie P. Hans, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Emily G. Owens, Editors’ Introduction to 
Judgment by the Numbers: Converting Qualitative to Quantitative Judgments in Law, 8 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 1–2 (2011) (“Errors in human judgment arise from 
the foibles of converting a subjective or qualitative judgment into a linear and quantitative scale.”). 
 6. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 787–94 (2001) (reporting experimental evidence showing that 
judges are susceptible to the influence of anchoring in assigning damage awards). 
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assigning awards and sentences might be pervasively unreliable, absent some 
remedial intervention. 
Although converting qualitative assessments into quantitative judgments is 
challenging,7 the rule of law requires that courts make these judgments in a consistent 
fashion. A criminal defendant’s sentence or a civil plaintiff’s damage award should 
arise from the facts and applicable law.8 It should not vary with the mood of the 
judge, the time of day, or the case that came before it. Excessively long criminal 
sentences constitute an immoral infliction of excess suffering, and overly short 
sentences fail to reflect society’s disapproval and demean the integrity of the victim.9 
Similarly, erratic damage awards in civil cases are unfair and suggest that the civil 
justice system is a chaotic game of chance in which some aggrieved victims go 
uncompensated, while others enjoy a windfall.10 
Deterrence in both civil and criminal cases also depends upon having courts 
assign sentences and damage awards reliably. A rational, just society should 
carefully tailor its criminal sentences to create an optimal level of deterrence.11 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. See David M. Studdert, Allen Kachalia, Joshua A. Salomon & Michelle M. Mello, 
Rationalizing Noneconomic Damages: A Health-Utilities Approach, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Summer 2011, at 57, 57 (“Quantifying noneconomic loss is a profound, longstanding, 
and seemingly intractable problem in the civil justice system.”). 
 8. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012) (requiring the sentencing judge to consider “the 
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who 
have been found guilty of similar conduct” when imposing a sentence); Marvin E. Frankel, 
The Quest for Equality in Sentencing, 25 ISR. L. REV. 595, 595 (1991) (“Any system of justice 
purporting to be civilized must pursue . . . that people similarly circumstanced are to be treated 
equally under the law . . . .”); Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Usman Mohammad, The 
Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000) (arguing 
that criminal codes make the understanding and application of laws easier as well as increase 
the uniformity of applying the law). 
 9. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 71 (1976) 
(“The offender . . . is being treated as though he deserves the unpleasantness that is being 
inflicted on him. That being the case, it should be inflicted only to the degree that it is 
deserved.” (emphasis omitted)); Norval Morris, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the 
University of Denver College of Law: Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation 22 (Nov. 12, 
1976) (“The concept of desert defines relationships between crimes and punishments on a 
continuum between the unduly lenient and the excessively punitive within which the just 
sentence may on other grounds be determined.”). 
 10. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 8 (1973) 
(asserting that disparities in sentencing violate horizontal equity and undermine public 
confidence); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REID HASTIE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A. SCHKADE & W. KIP 
VISCUSI, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 3 (2002) (“Our society is deeply committed 
to employing the force of government with reason and consistency. Discrepant punishments 
for the same act . . . are inconsistent with that commitment.”); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. 
Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 
83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 924 (1989) (“[F]undamental fairness requires similarly situated parties 
to be treated in a similar fashion by the legal system.” (emphasis omitted)); Studdert et al., 
supra note 7, at 59 (“Whatever the explanations, the heterogeneity in noneconomic-damages 
awards among injuries of similar severity is inefficient, inequitable, and has damaging 
consequences for the legitimacy of personal-injury compensation systems.”). 
 11. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
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Sentences that are too long impose unnecessary costs on society and offenders, while 
sentences that are too short fail to deter crime effectively. Likewise, inadequate civil 
damage awards fail to deter socially undesirable conduct, while awards that are too 
high needlessly deter socially useful activities.12 
Imperfection is, of course, inherent in any legal system. Studies from a wide 
variety of contexts suggest that litigants’ characteristics, such as their race13 or 
gender,14 influence criminal sentences and damage awards. So does the political 
orientation of the judge.15 Moreover, some tasks—notably, assessing some elements 
of civil damage awards—might be so indeterminate that judges lack the kind of 
meaningful guidance that would facilitate reliable judgments.16 These sources of 
legal indeterminacy, while unfortunate, are at least understood as unwanted parts of 
an unavoidably imperfect system.17 Extraneous influences, such as the type of 
                                                                                                                 
 
POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
 12. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 10 (1987). 
 13. See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges 
Vary in Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 350 (2012) (describing a study 
demonstrating racial disparities in sentencing); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically 
Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1103, 1159 (2004) (reviewing research indicating that the way individuals view race will cause 
them to judge the behavior of people differently, even if the behavior being judged is the same). 
 14. See, e.g., Amy Farrell, Geoff Ward & Danielle Rousseau, Intersections of Gender and 
Race in Federal Sentencing: Examining Court Contexts and the Effects of Representative 
Court Authorities, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 85, 91 (2010) (finding that the leniency that 
women experience may be attributable to criminal justice system authorities viewing women 
as less dangerous and believing that women “possess a generally greater potential for reform 
than men”); Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing 
System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 186 (1994) (“Women 
are more likely than similarly situated men to receive suspended sentences or probation.”). 
 15. Research assessing the influence of judges’ political preferences is extensive. See 
generally, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, 
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 775 (2009); Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron & Harold J. Spaeth, 
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995). 
 16. See David Baldus, John C. MacQueen & George Woodworth, Improving Judicial 
Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur 
Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 
1182 (1995) (“[T]here is no ‘correct’ general damages award for any nonpecuniary harm.”); 
William Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 28 (1954) 
(“[P]ain and suffering have no dimensions, mathematical or financial. Whatever claim or 
award is based upon these intangibles must, therefore, be conceived at the end of a speculative 
and uncertain journey.”). 
 17. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E. 2d 372, 374–75 (N.Y. 1989) (“[R]ecovery for 
nonecomonic losses such as pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life rests on ‘the legal 
fiction that money damages can compensate for a victim’s injury.’ We accept this fiction, 
knowing that although money will neither ease the pain nor restore the victim’s abilities, this 
device is as close as the law can come in its effort to right the wrong. We have no hope of 
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defendant or the political attitude of the judge, can be thought of as measurement 
error in the legal system. Judges and juries use different yardsticks to measure the 
harm done to women as opposed to men18 or to assess the appropriate punishment 
assigned to defendants of different races.19 Variability among judges is an unfortunate 
but unavoidable aspect of the nature of justice dispensed by human beings. Some 
judges, by their nature, will impose more severe sentences than their colleagues.20 Even 
with intricate sentencing guidelines, detailed sentencing reports prepared by probation 
officers, and lengthy arguments by attorneys, some judicial discretion will remain to 
be exercised differently by judges of different predilections.21 
Invidious biases toward litigants, the influence of political orientation of judges, and 
case complexity, however, are all such widely acknowledged impediments to 
consistent adjudication that society attempts to reduce these influences in several ways. 
Codes of judicial ethics require judges to avoid judgments based on race or gender, and 
case law requires judges to avoid even the appearance of such improprieties.22 The 
judicial appointment process also addresses concerns regarding the appointment of 
judges deemed to be overly partisan.23 Judges in many jurisdictions also face elections, 
which are another source of accountability.24 In criminal cases, sentencing guidelines 
constrain sentences, thereby limiting the degree to which erratic judgment might 
adversely affect outcomes.25 
                                                                                                                 
 
evaluating what has been lost, but a monetary award may provide a measure of solace for the 
condition created.” (citations omitted)). 
 18. See, e.g., Jane Goodman, Elizabeth F. Loftus, Marian Miller & Edith Greene, Money, 
Sex, and Death: Gender Bias in Wrongful Death Damage Awards, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 263, 
281 (1991) (reporting experimental evidence that jurors award more in wrongful death suits 
involving male victims than female victims). 
 19. See David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: 
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 311–12 (2001) (reporting a large 
racial disparity in sentences imposed under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious 
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221–26 (2009) (concluding 
that implicit racial biases affect judges’ sentences). 
 20. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 527 (2001) (explaining that judges have their own beliefs about particular crimes and how 
broadly they should be defined, which affects how statutes are interpreted and enforced). 
 21. See id. at 529 (finding that “[i]deological differences, public-interested goals, [and] 
the reigning institutional culture” can affect or even dominate the behavior of judges). 
 22. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (2011) (“A judge shall not, 
in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage 
in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, 
gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, 
socioeconomic status, or political affiliation . . . .”). 
 23. For a recent discussion of this concern, see generally JOHN R. LOTT, JR., DUMBING 
DOWN THE COURTS: HOW POLITICS KEEPS THE SMARTEST JUDGES OFF THE BENCH (2013). 
 24. See Joanna Shepherd, Measuring Maximizing Judges: Empirical Legal Studies, 
Public Choice Theory, and Judicial Behavior, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1753, 1760 tbl.1 
(documenting the various state judicial selection and retention procedures). 
 25. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989) (noting that the federal 
sentencing guidelines were intended to remedy two “unjustifi[ed]” and “shameful” 
deficiencies in the previous sentencing regime, the first of which was “the great variation 
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Efforts to identify and root out systematic deviations in sentences and awards, 
however, presuppose that if judges all could be induced to measure desert and harm 
the same way across litigants of different races and genders, then reliability would 
emerge. This understanding of the criminal and civil justice systems can thus be 
likened to measurement error in intelligence testing. Test theory suggests that there 
exists a correct IQ score for any individual,26 but it acknowledges that individual test 
performance will vary based on mood and mistake and that biases exist in tests 
themselves that unreasonably influence how people from different races perform.27 
But underlying test theory is a faith that there exists a true IQ score and that the 
results of any one test will measure this true score, along with some error variance.28 
This is precisely the model underlying the criminal and civil justice systems. For 
every offender and every injured plaintiff, there exists a correct sentence and a 
correct award. Each case produces this correct sentence and award, along with some 
degree of error variance. As long as the error component is small and not systematic, 
it can be tolerable. We suspect, however, that the cognitive processes that underlie 
numeric judgments in court face a more fundamental problem than measurement 
error. We argue that numeric judgments are constructed in a case-by-case fashion 
and thus cannot be made consistent simply by inducing judges to ignore invidious 
factors and harmonizing judges’ political and social values. 
Our thesis that damage awards and sentences are constructed in an ad hoc fashion 
arises from a contemporary understanding of human judgment and decision making. 
Psychologists who study judgment and choice argue that judgments are constructed 
in context.29 When people estimate what they would be willing to pay for a new home 
or an iPad, they are not mentally downloading a preexisting, fixed assessment of the 
value of these commodities; rather, they are creating a set of preferences that are a 
product of a specific context. This is not to say that the price they are willing to pay 
is wholly arbitrary. People recognize that a 3500-square-foot home in a nice 
neighborhood is more valuable than an iPad. The value of the items affects people’s 
mental constructions, but the process is fundamentally one of mental creation rather 
than measurement. Judgments thus have an arbitrary coherence.30 The amount a 
customer is willing to pay for a consumer good arises from the customer’s mood, other 
decisions she may have recently made, and a wide range of ephemeral influences.31 
                                                                                                                 
 
among sentences imposed by different judges upon similarly situated offenders” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)). 
 26. See Timo M. Bechger, Gunter Maris, Huub H. F. M. Verstralen & Anton A. Béguin, 
Using Classical Test Theory in Combination with Item Response Theory, 27 APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 319, 320 (2003). 
 27. See generally Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape 
Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613 (1997) (describing how 
stereotypes associated with race and gender affect test scores). 
 28. See Bechger et al., supra note 26, at 329. 
 29. See Dan Simon, Daniel C. Krawczyk, Airom Bleicher & Keith J. Holyoak, The Transience 
of Constructed Preferences, 21 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 1 (2008) (“A substantial body of 
literature on judgment and decision-making has been devoted to the construction of preferences. . . . 
It has been suggested that preferences are invented rather than found.”). 
 30. See ARIELY, supra note 2, at 26 (describing “arbitrary coherence” in preferences). 
 31. See Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference: An Overview, 
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We suspect that judgments made in the legal system are no different than 
judgments made in other parts of life.32 Judges certainly understand that a murderer 
deserves a more severe sentence than a shoplifter. But the exact sentence imposed 
will likely reflect contextual factors and an inherent underlying arbitrariness. 
Invidious biases, political influences, and simple indeterminacy are thus just the most 
visible symptoms of a more widespread problem in the legal system. Judges, like 
most people, lack the cognitive capacity to make reliable quantitative judgments in 
a complex environment. They can adopt mechanisms to produce a degree of 
reliability, but their judgments are inherently erratic. Recognizing this endemic 
characteristic of quantitative judgments provides a more solid footing for efforts to 
provide regularity to judgments. 
I. EVIDENCE OF ARBITRARINESS: ANCHORING AND SCALING 
Among the phenomena that demonstrate the arbitrary nature of choice, anchoring 
stands out as particularly significant. Anchoring refers to the tendency to rely on 
numeric reference points to make numeric judgments, even when such estimates are 
arbitrary, irrelevant, or ludicrous.33 The pervasive influence of anchoring reveals 
such a strong and systematic tendency to attend to decisional context, regardless of 
whether it is misleading, that it is prime evidence of an underlying arbitrariness in 
human numeric judgment.34 
The initial studies of anchoring identified the phenomenon as a somewhat 
innocuous example of the role that simple mental strategies play in judgment.35 
Tversky and Kahneman first demonstrated the influence of anchors on numeric 
judgments by asking undergraduates to estimate the percentage of countries in the 
United Nations that are African after giving them a transparently arbitrary reference 
point.36 Subjects were asked to spin a roulette-style wheel that was rigged to land on 
65 or 20. When the wheel landed on 65, subjects provided much higher estimates 
than when it landed on 20. The researchers also demonstrated that when asked to 
estimate the product of 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8, people provided lower estimates 
than when asked to estimate the product of 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1.37 
Tversky and Kahneman cited anchoring as one of a set of simple mental shortcuts 
(or heuristics) that people use to make judgments.38 They asserted that these shortcuts 
                                                                                                                 
 
in THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE 1, 2 (Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic eds., 2006) 
(“The variability in the ways we construct and reconstruct our preferences yields preferences 
that are labile, inconsistent, subject to factors we are unaware of, and not always in our own 
best interests.”). 
 32. See generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on 
the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) (presenting evidence that 
judges use the same kinds of decision-making strategies as most adults). 
 33. See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 146 (1993). 
 34. See ARIELY, supra note 2, at 33–36 (describing the influence of anchoring on judgment). 
 35. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 1 (identifying anchoring as one of a set of 
mental strategies people use to make decisions). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1128–32. 
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are useful but can lead to mistakes in judgment.39 Anchoring is often a sensible 
strategy for numeric assessment because anchors are commonly reasonable first 
approximations. For example, consumers know that they are not apt to pay the sticker 
price listed on a new automobile; rather, they will pay some amount less than this, 
depending upon their negotiation skills, the dealer’s disposition to make the sale, and 
various other factors. The sticker price, however, is a good initial estimate of the final 
price. Tversky and Kahneman argued that when the subjects in their studies relied 
on the random starting point, they were overusing a good strategy for making 
numeric judgments and failing to put enough cognitive effort into adjusting the initial 
reference point toward the correct estimate.40 
This account of anchoring as a useful heuristic that gets overused suggests that 
people are making fundamentally sound judgments, although these judgments get 
distorted. But the account does not explain why people fail to recognize how 
dangerous this heuristic is in situations in which the anchor is obviously irrelevant. 
In one study, researchers had undergraduate subjects write down the last three digits 
of their phone number and add 400 to it. The researchers then asked the subjects 
whether Attila the Hun was defeated in Europe before or after that year.41 After 
obtaining that answer, the researchers asked in what year Attila was defeated. The 
subjects knew perfectly well that their phone numbers had nothing to do with 
European history, but their final estimates of the year that Attila was defeated 
nevertheless correlated with their phone numbers. In another study, researchers asked 
undergraduates to identify the average price of a textbook in the campus bookstore.42 
For half of the participants, the researchers first asked whether the price was greater 
or less than $7163.52. When subjects first had to contemplate that absurd estimate, 
they provided higher estimates than those who had not been exposed to it. 
Anchoring has proven to be a robust phenomenon that affects all manner of 
judgments.43 In one study, a price provided by an admittedly uninformed person 
altered subjects’ estimates of the value of used automobiles.44 In another, the number 
on a football player’s uniform altered estimates of the likelihood that that player 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. Id. at 1124 (“In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to 
severe and systematic errors.”). 
 40. Id. at 1128 (noting that adjustments from initial starting points are typically insufficient). 
 41. J. EDWARD RUSSO & PAUL J.H. SCHOEMAKER, DECISION TRAPS: TEN BARRIERS TO 
BRILLIANT DECISION-MAKING AND HOW TO OVERCOME THEM 90 (1989). 
 42. PLOUS, supra note 33, at 146. 
 43. See Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Anchoring, Activation, and the 
Construction of Values, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 115, 117 
(1999) (“Demonstration of the anchoring effect are [sic] plentiful in studies of judgment.”); 
Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment 
Heuristic: Differential Processing of Self-Generated and Experimenter-Provided Anchors, 12 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 391, 391 (2001) (“Countless experiments have shown that people’s absolute 
answers are influenced by the initial comparison with the irrelevant anchor.”); Adrian Furnham 
& Hua Chu Boo, A Literature Review of the Anchoring Effect, 40 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 35, 41 
(2011) (“There is now nearly 40 years’ worth of research on the anchoring effect which has 
proved to be extremely robust.”). 
 44. Thomas Mussweiler, Fritz Strack & Tim Pfeiffer, Overcoming the Inevitable 
Anchoring Effect: Considering the Opposite Compensates for Selective Accessibility, 26 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1142, 1144–47 (2000). 
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would sack the opposing quarterback in an upcoming playoff game.45 Researchers 
found that people asked to predict the likelihood that the United States would deploy 
military troops to address the conflict in Yugoslavia gave lower estimates when they 
were first asked whether that likelihood was greater or less than 30% as opposed to 
70%.46 When people estimated the freezing point of vodka, they tended to start with 
32 degrees (the freezing point of water) and adjust insufficiently downward.47 When 
asked to estimate George Washington’s age when he died, people fixated on 
randomly generated numbers that were either too high or too low.48 The starting point 
in negotiations also anchors the final outcome, even when the starting point is not 
meaningful.49 Research on anchoring has also demonstrated that the phenomenon 
influences estimates of not only what goods might cost but also how much people 
are actually willing to pay.50 
But what accounts for the influence of anchors? At its core, anchoring is a 
demonstration that people construct numeric judgment from the surrounding 
context—even when that context is misleading and irrelevant.51 Researchers have 
identified three cognitive processes that allow irrelevant anchors to influence 
judgment: cognitive laziness, availability, and scale distortion.52 
First, Tversky and Kahneman initially described anchoring as a consequence of 
cognitive laziness.53 They maintained that cognitive effort is required to mentally 
adjust away from the initial anchor to the final estimate. This account supposes that 
in making numeric estimates, people mentally move their estimates to match the 
evidence that they have available for their understanding of the world. People 
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commonly fail to put enough effort into the adjustment process, so the initial anchor 
exerts too much influence over the final judgment.54 
A second, competing account of anchoring relies on cognitive availability. This 
model arose from the concern that adjustment cannot truly account for the range of 
influence anchors have.55 Researchers have proposed that anchors affect the focus of 
people’s attention and consequently affect their judgment.56 In rejecting ludicrous 
anchors, people call to mind the most extreme example that they can imagine.57 
When asked to estimate the average price of a college textbook, for example, the 
absurdly high anchor leads people to recall highly expensive books. When they 
recognize that even the most expensive textbooks are far below the absurd anchor, 
they can reject the hypothesis that the average book is truly that costly. But when 
they then estimate the actual average price, they are thinking about expensive books, 
which produces higher estimates.58 
The availability model of anchoring, however, fails to explain some of the more 
bizarre aspects of anchoring. Some of the studies involve anchoring in contexts where 
availability seems like an implausible explanation.59 For example, studies in which 
anchoring influences estimates involving historic events (such as the year George 
Washington was elected President) or scientific values (such as the freezing point of 
vodka) in which people rely on reference points that they know are inaccurate (1776, 
and 32 degrees Fahrenheit) do not seem to involve cognitive availability.60 
Furthermore, studies that do not require subjects to reject extreme hypotheses also 
facilitate anchoring. Shane Frederick and Daniel Mochon demonstrated, for example, 
that independent serial estimates create anchors.61 In one of their studies, subjects who 
first estimated the average weight of an adult male raccoon and then an adult male 
giraffe gave lower estimates for the giraffe than when they were asked to estimate the 
weights in the reverse order.62 The estimates for the weight of the raccoon were 
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likewise higher when subjects estimated the weight of the giraffe first.63 In effect, their 
estimates influenced each other, even though the subjects must have known that the 
estimates should have been independent because there was no basis for starting with 
the other animal’s weight as a reference point. The results are hard to square with either 
the cognitive laziness or availability accounts of anchoring. 
Concerned that neither cognitive laziness nor availability can fully account for 
anchoring, Frederick and Mochon offer a third account. They propose that anchoring 
consists of a temporary distortion in the process of translating a quantitative sense of 
some physical property into a quantitative assessment.64 When people struggle to 
decide whether a raccoon weighs 20 pounds, 1700 pounds (the right answer for a 
giraffe) seems like an extraordinarily great weight for an animal. Likewise, to a 
subject who concludes that 1700 pounds is right for the giraffe, 20 pounds seems like 
a paltry weight for an animal. 
Frederick and Mochon’s account of anchoring reveals not only how potent the 
effect is but also where the source of arbitrariness leaks into judgment. They 
demonstrate that anchors do not distort one’s sense of the underlying object in other 
ways (as the availability account suggests).65 When they ask questions about animals 
other than their weight that nevertheless relate to the animal’s size, they find no 
distortion. For example, people’s estimates of the average height of a giraffe do not 
change depending upon whether they are asked to make their estimates before or 
after they were asked about the weight of a raccoon or how many lions a giraffe 
carcass would feed. Even their sense of weight on a different scale does not change. 
Subjects asked to estimate how many grand pianos would balance with an average 
adult male giraffe are not influenced by previous estimates of the weight of raccoons 
in pounds either. Therefore, a low anchor generated by contemplating the weight of 
a small animal does not distort people’s sense of how big a giraffe is, but it does 
influence how people translate that sense into pounds. 
Whatever the explanation for anchoring, it is a powerful phenomenon. Real estate 
agents’ estimates of the sale price of homes are heavily influenced by meaningless 
variations in the initial listing price.66 The auction prices that University of Chicago 
business students are willing to submit for real commodities are influenced by first 
asking them whether they would be willing to pay more or less than part of their 
phone number.67 The distortion suggests that when people identify the value they 
would be willing to pay for an item, they might have a good sense of what the item 
is but no stable way of converting that sense into a price. It is no wonder that retailers 
use ridiculously high initial prices for retail clothing and then offer items on sale at 
50% or 70% off that meaningless initial price. People understand what the item is 
but do not have coherent ways of converting this understanding into a dollar amount. 
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II. ANCHORING AND JUDGES 
Anchoring can influence a wide variety of judgments in legal contexts,68 
especially civil damage awards and criminal sentences. Researchers have conducted 
numerous studies in mock-jury settings documenting a marked effect of anchors on 
damage-award estimates provided by lay adults.69 In one such study, researchers 
gave ordinary adults a description of a personal injury case and asked them for an 
appropriate damage award.70 The researchers varied the plaintiff’s attorney’s request 
for a specific damage award. The plaintiff either asked for no specific amount, for 
$20,000, for $5 million, or for $1 billion. Even though the range of requests was 
ridiculous, “[a]s the anchor amount increased, compensation increased.”71 As the title 
of that article suggests, “the more you ask for, the more you get.” Although other 
research suggests that an excessive request might backfire,72 numerous mock-jury 
studies document a persistent influence of damage award requests on damage awards.73 
Judges might or might not be as susceptible to anchoring as nonjudges. Anchoring 
distorts judgment in so many contexts that it seems likely to influence the kinds of 
numeric judgments judges must make. In a recent article, Judge Mark Bennett 
identified the influence of anchoring on judges as a major concern.74 Two studies of 
actual sentencing decisions indicate that judges have difficulty translating their 
qualitative sense of desert into numerical sentences; in particular, they fixate on 
certain numbers.75 Even the Supreme Court has cited the power of authoritative 
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anchors in holding that criminal defendants must be sentenced under extant 
sentencing guidelines—even though such guidelines are not binding.76 
On the other hand, judges’ training or experience might give them an advantage. 
Experience reduces (but does not eliminate) the influence of anchoring.77 Forcing 
decision makers to explain their choices—as judges frequently must do—also 
reduces the influence of anchors.78 One study that directly compares punitive damage 
awards of judges and juries demonstrates that jury awards are more erratic than 
judicial awards.79 Selecting damage awards and criminal sentences is deadly serious 
business for judges, and they doubtless put a great deal of effort into the task. But 
imposing awards and sentences requires the same basic cognitive task seen in the 
studies of anchoring. Therefore, judges might exhibit the same kinds of difficulties 
setting awards and sentences reliably as subjects in the research on anchoring. 
A series of previous studies suggests that anchoring has a powerful influence on 
judicial decision making. In one experiment, we asked federal magistrate judges to 
identify an appropriate damage award in a hypothetical personal injury lawsuit.80 The 
materials indicated that the plaintiff was badly injured in an accident with the 
defendant’s delivery truck. The defendant had admitted to liability, and the only 
remaining issue was damages. After describing the injury briefly, we asked half of 
the judges to identify an appropriate damage award. We asked the same question of 
the other half, but only after asking them to first rule on a motion to dismiss the case 
for failing to satisfy the minimum amount in controversy for jurisdiction in federal 
court—$75,000. Virtually all who were asked to decide the motion denied it, but 
those who ruled on the motion also awarded the plaintiff less money than those in 
the control group. The judges who had not ruled on the motion awarded an average 
of $1,249,000, whereas judges who first denied the motion to dismiss awarded an 
average of $882,000.81 Even though the motion was frivolous, it injected the low 
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anchor into the judges’ thinking and thereby influenced their assessment of the 
appropriate award. 
In a second experiment with similar materials, we found that judges attend to 
anchors that they are explicitly supposed to ignore.82 We used the same basic 
description of the severely injured plaintiff we employed in the first study, again 
asserting that the defendant had admitted to liability, and the only remaining issue 
was setting an appropriate damage award.83 We also told the judges to imagine that 
they had presided over a settlement conference between the parties. In one variant of 
this study, the materials either informed the judges that the plaintiff had been willing 
to settle for $175,000 or stated no amount. Judges who learned of the low demand 
provided lower awards than the judges who did not.84 In another version, the 
materials either informed the judges that the plaintiff would not accept less than $10 
million or stated no amount. Judges who learned of the high demand provided higher 
awards than judges who did not.85 In all cases, the materials reiterated the evidentiary 
rule prohibiting the use of any information disclosed during settlement conferences 
in trials. Anchoring seemed to triumph over this injunction. 
We have found that anchoring not only leads judges to ignore the rules of evidence 
but also leads them to ignore the Supreme Court of the United States. In a third study, 
we gave bankruptcy judges a hypothetical case involving a financial restructuring 
known as a “cramdown”.86 The case required each bankruptcy judge to adjust the 
interest rate of a loan secured by an independent trucker’s rig. Governing law 
required that the court set the interest rate at the prevailing prime rate, adjusted 
upwards to reflect the risk of nonpayment. We reminded the judges that the Supreme 
Court had recently insisted that the original interest rate on the loan was not a relevant 
consideration.87 The judges ignored the Court’s command, however. Judges who 
learned that the initial rate was 21% provided a higher rate than judges who were not 
told of this amount.88 
In a fourth study of anchors, we found that even bizarre testimony can produce a 
numeric anchor that influences judgment.89 In this study, we asked administrative 
law judges attending a national conference to assess a damage award for the plaintiff 
in an employment discrimination suit. The materials identified the plaintiff as a 
Mexican-American administrative assistant with an excellent employment record. A 
new supervisor began calling her racial epithets in front of her coworkers—and her 
daughter, in one instance. When she complained, he fired her. The materials 
indicated that she brought suit through a city human rights commission, but because 
she found another position right away, her damages were limited to “mental anguish” 
for the wrongful termination. For half of the judges, the plaintiff indicated that she 
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had recently seen a “court TV show” in which a similar plaintiff was awarded 
compensatory damages for mental anguish.90 The other half of the judges saw the 
same testimony but were told that the claimant in the TV show had received a 
compensatory damage award of $415,300. This anchor had a huge effect on the 
judges: those who did not see the anchor awarded a median of $6,250, while those 
who saw it awarded a median of $50,000.91 
An experiment conducted in Germany also showed that judges are vulnerable to 
anchoring when setting criminal sentences.92 The researchers asked judges to impose 
a sentence for a hypothetical defendant convicted of robbery. The judges first rolled 
two dice and then were asked whether the sentence should be higher or lower than 
the total. Just as undergraduates’ phone numbers influenced their estimates of the 
year of Attila the Hun’s defeat, the roll of the dice influenced judges’ estimates of an 
appropriate criminal sentence.93 A similar study by two of the same researchers also 
showed that suggestions from both prosecutors and defense attorneys influenced 
judges’ sentences in a hypothetical case.94 
Are anchors as powerful in real cases as they are in the laboratory?95 Archival 
data are harder to assess because it is difficult to control for unobserved variables. 
Attorneys doubtless ask for more money when the underlying damages are more 
serious. But what research exists suggests that anchoring influences both damage 
awards and criminal sentences. A study of both judges and jurors in state courts, for 
example, showed that economic damages and noneconomic damages are highly 
correlated, suggesting that they anchor each other.96 Another paper showed that the 
recommendations of probation officers appear to anchor judges’ sentences.97 A study 
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of sentences assigned by Maryland trial judges based upon mishandled sentencing 
forms also showed that erroneous sentencing recommendations influenced judges’ 
sentences.98 Recent research on judges in Taiwan who set compensation rates for 
unlawful use of land demonstrated that these judges rely heavily on awards suggested 
by the litigants.99 
These studies indicate that judges’ damage awards and criminal sentences are not 
always well grounded in reasonable estimates of a case’s merits. But the evidence is 
not conclusive because, with one exception, the anchors in these studies arguably 
provided some relevant information. In the case of the motion, the defendant could 
have been conveying its belief that the case was truly worth very little. In the 
settlement cases, the offer by the plaintiff is actually relevant, even though judges 
are supposed to ignore it. The judges who saw the reference to $415,300 in the 
employment discrimination case also could have interpreted this as an indication that 
the case was much more serious than the facts suggested. Similarly, the high initial 
interest rate could have signaled to the bankruptcy judges that the debtor presented 
enormous credit risks that other facts did not reveal. Likewise, all of the research 
using archival data involved anchors that were apt to be meaningful, or at least appear 
to be meaningful, to the judges. Only the German experiment involving the roll of 
the dice as an anchor provided direct evidence that numeric reference points that are 
transparently irrelevant affect judges. The study is helpful in this regard, but using 
dice as a reference point is obviously strange and might have undermined the judges’ 
willingness to take the study seriously. It is hard to imagine what the judges thought 
that the point of the dice roll was in this experiment. Nevertheless, determining 
whether arbitrary anchors distort judges’ decisions in more realistic settings requires 
further investigation. 
In sum, the weight of evidence suggests that anchors influence judges 
excessively. Even if some of the anchors in the studies appear to convey 
meaningful information, the influence of anchoring cuts across so many domains 
that it appears to be a robust phenomenon. 
III. THE CURRENT STUDY 
To determine whether judges are subject to arbitrary influences that can produce 
erratic awards and sentences, we conducted four new studies in which we exposed 
active trial judges to various forms of anchors. In these studies, we used the same 
methodology that we have used in past research on judges.100 That is, judges 
attending judicial education conferences reviewed the facts of a hypothetical case 
that called for a numeric judgment. All of the judges reviewed the same case, except 
we exposed some of the judges to a variation in the fact pattern that was designed to 
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test for the anchoring effect. In the first of these studies, we tested whether the metric 
used to sentence defendants (months versus years) influenced the judges’ sentences. 
In the second study, we explored whether informing judges of a damage cap would 
alter how they assessed damage awards. In the third, we simply varied the order in 
which judges sentenced two criminal defendants on the theory that the first sentence 
might anchor the second. In the final study, we used a plaintiff’s offhand reference 
to an award on a “court TV show” as an anchor, and we also tested an inoculant 
designed to eliminate or reduce the influence of anchoring. 
In all instances, the hypothetical cases were embedded within a group of three to 
five other cases designed to address other issues. On the last page of the survey, we 
asked the judges to identify their gender, years of experience as a judge, and political 
orientation.101 Finally, we gave the judges the opportunity to respond to the survey and 
participate in the educational program but to withdraw their survey for purposes of data 
analysis. A small number of judges did this and were removed from the analysis. 
A. Study 1: Scaling Effects 
– “Five hundred twenty-five thousand six hundred minutes. How do you 
measure, measure a year?”102 
The widespread influence of anchoring on numeric judgments suggests that 
damage awards and sentences do not reflect stable assessments of the appropriate 
amount of compensation or punishment. There are many scales on which quantities 
may be expressed. If numeric assessments are as malleable as the research on 
anchoring suggests, judges might be vulnerable to distortions of the scale they use to 
render judgments. Even though years and dollars are units with clear meaning that 
judges should understand well, the research on anchoring suggests that people’s 
perception of such units can vary. 
Scale distorts judgments and preferences. A wide range of studies have 
documented such effects. Consumers prefer rewards programs that are denominated 
in thousands of points rather than hundreds, even though the units are set 
arbitrarily.103 Stock splits increase share value, even though they have no effect on a 
firm’s true worth.104 Travelers who have to translate their currency of higher value 
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 102. JONATHAN LARSON, Seasons of Love, on RENT: ORIGINAL BROADWAY CAST 
RECORDING (Dreamworks Records 1996). 
 103. See Rajesh Bagchi & Xingbo Li, Illusionary Progress in Loyalty Programs: 
Magnitudes, Reward Distances, and Step-Size Ambiguity, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 888, 892–95 
(2010) (reporting research in which subjects expressed a greater affinity for a consumer reward 
program in which points and prizes were denominated in thousands). 
 104. See Subhankar Nayak & Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala, Disentangling the Dividend 
Information in Splits: A Decomposition Using Conditional Event-Study Methods, 14 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 1083, 1112 (2001) (analyzing data on stock splits and concluding that “46% of split 
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into one of lower value (such as when Americans use pesos) tend to overspend.105 
Similarly, American consumers express less willingness to pay for a silk tie as the 
nominal denomination of the currency in which the item is priced increases.106 
Workers are happier with a 5% raise in a time of 12% inflation than with a 7% salary 
cut in the face of 0% inflation, even though the two are economically identical.107 
Gamblers treat a 5–9 in 100 chance of winning as higher than a 1 in 10 chance.108 
People planning for a wilderness trek state that a battery for a GPS device needed to 
guide them will be more reliable when the battery life is described as 120 minutes rather 
than 2 hours.109 People say they are willing to pay 126 euros for a cellphone with an 
advertised battery life of 6 days, but only 102 euros for one with a battery life of 144 
hours.110 Movie watchers state that they would prefer a movie rental plan that offered 
7 movies per week for $10 per week over one that offered 9 movies per week for $12 
per week; but their preferences reverse when the plans were multiplied out into a whole 
year; that is, they preferred a plan that offered 468 (9 x 52) movies per year for $12 per 
week over one that offered 364 (7 x 52) movies per year for $10 per week.111 
As this research suggests, changes in time scales commonly have a large effect 
on judgment and choice. People find cancer risks to be more frightening when 
expressed as a risk per day rather than as a risk per year.112 People perceive an 
                                                                                                                 
 
valuation effects are not caused by dividend information implied by splits”). 
 105. See Klaus Wertenbroch, Dilip Soman & Amitava Chattopadhyay, On the Perceived 
Value of Money: The Reference Dependence of Currency Numerosity Effects, 34 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 1, 7 (2007) (presenting evidence showing that “consumers . . . anchor[] on the numerosity 
of the nominal difference between that reference standard and the price of the transaction in 
order to estimate the real value of that transaction”). 
 106. See Priya Raghubir & Joydeep Srivastava, Effect of Face Value on Product Valuation 
in Foreign Currencies, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 335, 338–39 (2002) (“[S]ubjects’ willingness to 
pay increased with the face value of the foreign currency as the exchange rate became a larger 
multiple of the home currency.”). 
 107. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint 
on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 731 (1986) (reporting 
that 22% of subjects stated that a 7% raise in the face of 12% inflation was unfair, but 62% 
stated that a 7% reduction in salary in the absence of inflation was unfair); see also Eldar 
Shafir, Peter Diamond & Amos Tversky, Money Illusion, 112 Q.J. ECON. 341, 366–72 (1997) 
(documenting numerous examples of similar effects). 
 108. See Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and Rational 
Processing: When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 819, 822 (1994). 
 109. See Y. Charles Zhang & Norbert Schwarz, How and Why 1 Year Differs from 365 Days: 
A Conversational Logic Analysis of Inferences from the Granularity of Quantitative Expressions, 
39 J. CONSUMER RES. 248, 255 (2012) (“Participants estimated that a battery life claim of ‘up to 
2 hours’ would translate into actual service of 1.49 hours (equal to 89 minutes), whereas a claim 
of ‘up to 120 minutes’ would translate into actual service of 106 minutes.”). 
 110. See Christophe Lembregts & Mario Pandelaere, Are All Units Created Equal? The 
Effect of Default Units on Product Evaluations, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 1275, 1282 (2013). 
 111. See Katherine A. Burson, Richard P. Larrick & John G. Lynch, Jr., Six of One, Half 
Dozen of the Other: Expanding and Contracting Numerical Dimensions Produces Preference 
Reversals, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1074, 1076–77 (2009). 
 112. See Sucharita Chandran & Geeta Menon, When a Day Means More than a Year: Effects 
of Temporal Framing on Judgments of Health Risk, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 375, 384 (2004). 
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increase in the length of a product warranty from 84 months to 108 months as a more 
valuable increase than an increase from 7 years to 9 years.113 People asked how much 
they will spend in 12 months provide lower numbers than when they are asked how 
much they will spend in 1 year.114 When offered a chance to donate to a worthy cause, 
52% of MBA students said they would be willing to donate 85 cents per day, even 
though only 30% were willing to donate $300 per year.115 Public radio campaigns 
commonly ask for a donation that amounts to “pennies a day” rather than dollars per 
year.116 One year, it seems, does not mean the same thing to most people as 12 
months or 365 days. 
These results can be bewildering, but they begin to make sense in light of how 
psychologists have found that people make choices. People do not make purchasing 
decisions by tapping into an underlying sense of value, but instead construct 
decisions using simple cognitive processes.117 As many of the studies suggest, people 
prefer goods that come in larger numbers and hence prefer goods with attributes 
denominated in smaller units—a phenomenon known as “numerosity.”118 Larger 
numbers often mean more of an item is available and hence make the amount of that 
item seem more valuable.119 Even chickens will work harder to earn a kernel of corn 
that has been divided into four parts than one that is whole.120 People also assume 
that the unit is chosen in a meaningful fashion121 and therefore infer that smaller units 
connote a more precise estimate.122 Furthermore, people like units that are familiar 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. See Mario Pandelaere, Barbara Briers & Christophe Lembregts, How To Make a 29% 
Increase Look Bigger: The Unit Effect in Option Comparisons, 38 J. CONSUMER RES. 308, 
310–11 (2011). 
 114. Gülden Ülkümen, Manoj Thomas & Vicki G. Morwitz, Will I Spend More in 12 
Months or a Year? The Effect of Ease of Estimation and Confidence on Budget Estimates, 35 
J. CONSUMER RES. 245, 253 (2008). 
 115. John T. Gourville, Pennies-a-Day: The Effect of Temporal Reframing on Transaction 
Evaluation, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 395, 396 (1998) (reporting that “the percentage of subjects 
agreeing to donate was significantly higher under the [donation-per-day condition] than under 
the aggregate framing (52 vs. 30 percent . . . )”). 
 116. See, e.g., id. at 395 (“Chicago Public Radio has an ongoing membership drive in 
which individuals are asked to join their ‘Dollar-a-Day Club.’”). 
 117. See Lichtenstein & Slovic, supra note 31, at 2 (“The variability in the ways we 
construct and reconstruct our preferences yields preferences that are labile, inconsistent, 
subject to factors we are unaware of, and not always in our own best interests. Indeed, so 
pervasive is this liability that the very notion of a ‘true’ preference must, in many situations, 
be rejected.”). 
 118. See Brett W. Pelham, Tin Tin Sumarta & Laura Myaskovsky, The Easy Path from 
Many to Much: The Numerosity Heuristic, 26 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 103, 104 (1994) 
(“[P]eople . . . sometimes overinfer quantity from numerosity.”). 
 119. Id. at 105 (“[M]ore pieces of something usually turns out to be more of that 
something.” (emphasis in original)). 
 120. John B. Wolf & Martin D. Kaplon, Effect of Amount of Reward and Consummative 
Activity on Learning in Chickens, 31 J. COMP. PSYCHOL. 353, 358–59 (1941). 
 121. See Zhang & Schwarz, supra note 109, at 249 (arguing that norms of communication 
suggest that people will convey information in relevant units). 
 122. Id. at 251 (“[C]onsumers infer that the real value is closer to the communicated value 
when it is conveyed in fine-grained rather than coarse units . . . .”). 
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and convey some sense of fluency and meaning.123 Finally, because people tend to 
prefer commodities that are easier to assess,124 expressing the quantity of something 
in a meaningful metric makes it more attractive.125 
A study conducted by McAuliff and Bornstein demonstrates the potential power 
of scale in a legal setting.126 These researchers had jury-eligible adults read a 
description of a personal injury case in which the defendant was clearly liable. The 
researchers asked their subjects to identify an appropriate award for the 2 years of 
pain and suffering that the plaintiff had experienced. The plaintiff’s attorney varied 
the request for damages in his closing argument by doing one of the following: not 
stating an amount (control condition); asking for $10 per hour for 2 years (hours 
scale); asking for $7300 per month for 24 months (months scale); or asking for 
$175,000 (anchor condition). The requests for $175,000 and $10 per hour produced 
the highest awards. The $175,000 likely acted as an anchor, which explains why it 
produced high awards. The ability of the hours scale to produce a high award relative 
to the monthly scale shows the importance of scaling. For many of the subjects, 
$7300 per month and $10 per hour can easily be compared to a wage or salary. For 
most, $10 per hour might not seem like much, so it seemed like a reasonable basis 
for an award. But $7300 per month seems like a lot of money each month (even 
though it is almost identical to $10 per hour times 24 hours times 30 days). The study 
thus shows both the power of anchors and the effect that variation in scale can have 
on judgment. Different scales convey different meanings and thus produce variations 
in how much an injury seems worth. 
Do variations in scale affect judges when they make quantitative judgments? 
Unlike the nonjudge adults in McAuliff and Bornstein’s study, judges are experts. 
They might not be affected by specious differences in amounts or durations. On the 
other hand, variations in scale might convey different impressions and trigger 
different associations in judges, just as they do in others. One year might not mean 
the same to a judge as 12 months, and 360 months might not trigger the same 
impression as 30 years. 
1. Methods and Materials 
To test whether judges are vulnerable to such scaling effects, we gave judges a 
one-page description of a criminal case and asked them to impose a criminal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. See Lembregts & Pandelaere, supra note 110, at 1278 (“Given that people are more 
familiar with default units, consumers should be able to process attribute information more 
easily when it appears in default units rather than in nondefault units.”). 
 124. See Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference 
Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 247, 255–56 (1996) (describing a series of studies 
showing that people prefer items that are easier to evaluate). 
 125. See Lembregts & Pandelaere, supra note 110, at 1283–84 (presenting evidence 
supporting the researchers’ prediction that “the processing fluency associated with the unit 
mediates the effects of default units on product evaluations”). 
 126. Bradley D. McAuliff & Brian H. Bornstein, All Anchors Are Not Created Equal: The 
Effects of Per Diem Versus Lump Sum Requests on Pain and Suffering Awards, 34 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 164 (2010). 
2015] CAN JUDGES MAKE RELIABLE NUMERIC JUDGMENTS? 715 
 
sentence. The materials described a defendant named “Smith” as having “pled guilty 
to simple voluntary manslaughter.” The materials indicated that Smith admitted 
stabbing a fellow customer to death in a bar after “the victim informed him that he 
had had sexual intercourse with Smith’s fiancé.” Smith had not been drinking. The 
materials also described Smith’s background as follows: 
Smith is 23 years old and has no significant criminal history, though he 
was once arrested, but not charged, following a bar fight while he was 
intoxicated. He is in good health and does not appear to have a substance 
abuse problem, although he admits that he occasionally drinks to excess. 
He has been employed as a custodian for the past four years at a large 
office complex. He remains unmarried and has no children. 
We asked all of the judges to sentence Smith. We posed the following question to 
half of the judges: “Without regard to the sentence maximum in your own 
jurisdiction, how many years would you sentence Smith to serve in prison, based on 
the facts above?” This was followed by a blank labeled “___/years.” For the other 
half, we replaced the word “years” with “months” and followed this with a blank 
labeled “___/months.” In effect, we asked half of the judges to sentence the defendant 
in years and the other half in months. 
We presented these materials to 135 judges attending the American Judges’ 
Association annual conference in Denver, Colorado, in 2010. These judges attended 
a plenary session entitled “How Do Judges Judge” on the first day of their 
conference. These judges came from all over the United States, although most were 
state court judges.127 The judges had an average of 13 years of experience as judges 
(a median of 12 years), ranging from 6 months to 40 years. Of the 128 who reported 
their gender, 37 (29%) were females. Of the 112 judges who reported their political 
affiliation as Republican or Democratic (we omitted those who identified as other, 
independent, or simply refused to answer), 38 (34%) were Republicans and 62% 
were Democrats.128 
Substantively, the appropriate sentence for voluntary manslaughter varies by 
jurisdiction. Procedurally, some of the states rely primarily on sentences assigned in 
years and some on sentences assigned in months (as the federal system does).129 
Furthermore, some states follow sentencing guidelines that restrict or guide 
sentencing, while others do not.130 Our materials asked judges to sentence without 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. All but 3 of the judges were trial judges. 
 128. A total of 23 judges identified themselves as independent, unaffiliated, or did not 
respond to our question about political affiliation: “Which of the two major political parties in 
the United States most closely matches your own political beliefs?” We excluded these judges 
from any analysis of political party so that the judges are simply identified as Republican or 
Democratic. We treated political orientation the same way in all of our studies. Thus, the 
percentage of Democratic and Republican judges always adds up to 100%. 
 129. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 4, § 5A (depicting a sentencing table denoted 
in months); see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West 2014) (years); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-4704 (2007) (months); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42 (West 2014) (years); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (months); MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY § 4A (2014) (months). 
 130. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND 
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regard to the sentencing maximum in their own jurisdiction and did not provide any 
guidelines for judges to follow in setting the sentence. 
2. Results 
Sentencing format had an enormous effect on the judges. The 71 judges who 
sentenced in years provided an average sentence of 9.7 years, or 115 months.131 In 
contrast, the 60 judges who sentenced in months provided an average sentence of 
only 66.4 months, or 5.5 years. This difference was statistically significant.132 As 
Table 1 (below) shows, the distribution of the sentences varied markedly between 
the two formats. Only 22% (13 out of 60) of the judges sentencing in months imposed 
sentences greater than the median sentence of judges sentencing in years (9 years), 
and only 1.7% (1 out of 60) of the judges sentencing in months assigned a sentence 
greater than the 75th percentile of judges sentencing in years (12.5 years). 
Table 1. Sentence length by condition: average, percentiles and standard deviation (in years) 
Condition 
(and n) Average 
25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Standard 
deviation 
Months (60) 5.5 3.0 5.0 8.0 3.5 
Years (71) 9.7 5.0 9.0 12.5 6.8 
The judges’ demographic backgrounds had little effect on these results. Male 
judges assigned slightly longer sentences on average than female judges (8.1 versus 
7.0 years), but this difference was not statistically significant.133 Judges who 
identified as Democrats assigned essentially identical sentences to those who 
identified as Republicans (7.8 versus 7.7 years, respectively, which was not a 
statistically significant difference).134 Experience did not correlate with sentence 
length.135 None of these variables interacted statistically significantly with the 
variation in scale.136 
The judges sentencing in years expressed greater variability than judges 
sentencing in months. The standard deviation of the judges’ sentences was nearly 
twice as large among judges sentencing in years as compared to months. This 
                                                                                                                 
 
CONTINUUM 3 (2008) (reporting that 21 states have sentencing guidelines). 
 131. Three judges did not respond to this question. 
 132. t(129) = 4.51, p < 0.001. Months were divided by 12 to facilitate the comparison. 
Because the standard errors varied, the t-test was performed with no assumption of equal 
variance in each condition. 
 133. t(126) = 1.00, p = 0.32. 
 134. t(110) = 0.09, p = 0.92. 
 135. r = .05, p = 0.56. 
 136. This analysis was accomplished with a linear regression of the sentence on the scale 
(years versus months), experience, gender, party affiliation, and an interaction of these three 
terms with the scale. The t statistics for the three interaction terms were 1.06, 1.05, and 0.14 
respectively, with p values of 0.29, 0.30, and 0.88. 
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difference was statistically significant.137 That said, in both conditions, the standard 
deviation was roughly proportional to the average length of the sentence in that 
condition. Hence, it does not seem that the judges in the years condition sentenced 
more erratically than the judges in the months condition. 
3. Discussion 
Judges sentencing in months imposed shorter sentences than judges sentencing in 
years. To the judges sentencing in years, roughly 9 years was about the right 
sentence. But fewer than 25% of the judges sentencing in months assigned sentences 
of that length or greater. Although 9 years seemed like an appropriate sentence to the 
judges, 108 months seemed far too long. 
The result is consistent with the previous findings concerning anchoring in judges. 
Anchors distort the sense of scale that facilitates a reliable translation of a qualitative 
sense of the appropriate sentence into a numeric sentence. So too does the actual 
scale. Apparently, 12 months seems different to judges than 1 year. In this scenario, 
the scale provided no information to the judges about the case, and yet it distorted 
their sentences. 
This result does not necessarily suggest that jurisdictions that assign sentences in 
months are more lenient than those that sentence in years. We suspect that judges 
become accustomed to the scale that they are using over time. Our result suggests 
only that in an unfamiliar, impressionistic setting, judges reacted to the scale. 
At least one jurisdiction has attempted to take advantage of this scaling effect in order 
to influence the duration of sentences. In 1991, Finnish “[c]ourts were . . . encouraged 
to use short sentences of imprisonment by instructing them to mete out the shorter 
sentences in days instead of months.”138 Sentence length declined after the change. 
Because other reforms accompanied the change in metric, it is impossible to determine 
the exact cause of the decline with certainty, but our research implicates the metric.139 
The possible difference between judges accustomed to sentencing in months 
versus years suggests that one potential explanation for the effect is weak 
mathematics among those judges who normally sentence in years. We believe that 
judges are perfectly capable of multiplying 9 x 12 to reach the appropriate sentence. 
The judges might not have done the math explicitly, however, and may have simply 
made a rough estimate of the appropriate sentence. The result thus resembles an early 
study of anchoring conducted by Tversky and Kahneman in which they asked 
subjects either to determine the product of 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 or the product 
of 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1.140 Any undergraduate is capable of solving either of 
these mathematical functions precisely, but most of the subjects made intuitive 
estimates instead. Those who started with the lower numbers produced lower 
estimates than those who started with the higher numbers. Tversky and Kahneman 
suggested that the subjects multiplied the first few numbers, used that partial product 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. F(70, 29) = 3.69, p < 0.001. 
 138. See Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Sentencing and Punishment in Finland: The Decline of the 
Repressive Ideal, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 92, 113 (Michael 
Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001). 
 139. Id. at 114. 
 140. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 1, at 1128. 
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as an anchor, and made inadequate upward adjustments. Thus, when the initial 
numbers used were higher, the subjects produced higher final estimates. 
We also suspect that the effect of scale might vary with the severity of the crime. 
Severe crimes that demand lengthy sentences of 20 years or more might produce the 
opposite effect. As the number of months grows into the hundreds, judges might start 
to become insensitive to the length of the sentence. The difference between 300 and 
360 months might not seem as notable as the difference between 25 and 30 years. 
Likewise, sentences at the low end of the scale also reverse the result we identified. 
A sentence of 24 months might seem longer than a sentence of 2 years. 
The variation among sentencing systems might provide one alternative account 
of our result that suggests that the scale inadvertently provided some information to 
the judges. Some jurisdictions assign sentences in months (or even days) for less 
severe crimes and in years for more serious crimes.141 Judges who are familiar with 
such systems might have assumed that the “years” prompt suggested that the crime 
was more serious and hence should draw a more severe sentence. We doubt that this 
is the explanation, though, for two reasons. First, the magnitude of the effect is too 
large to be explained by the behavior of a small number of judges. The scale seemed 
to shift the range of sentences, suggesting that the scale influenced most of the 
judges, not just the small number who reside in a jurisdiction with such a system. 
Second, the crime used in the survey is a familiar one to judges. Voluntary 
manslaughter is a serious crime in every jurisdiction and merits a lengthy sentence. 
Experienced judges could not conceivably have confused this crime with a low-level 
barroom brawl that might have produced a short sentence for assault and battery. 
This was a serious crime, and we are confident judges knew it. 
B. Study 2: Damage Caps 
To test whether anchoring would influence judges even when the anchor cannot 
plausibly provide them with relevant information, we considered highlighting 
numeric reference points of which judges were already aware. Our initial study of 
the effect of filing a motion to dismiss for failing to meet the minimum amount in 
controversy for federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction itself was an effort of this 
sort. We suspect that federal judges are well aware that the jurisdictional threshold 
for diversity claims is $75,000. Thus, mentioning the amount in the motion provided 
no new information but, as we noted above, filing the motion might have suggested to 
judges that the case was worth far less than they had thought. The legal system, 
however, provides numerous dollar amounts of various sorts that judges understand 
well and yet might not relate to a particular case. 
Damage caps are one source of such numbers. Numerous jurisdictions have 
implemented damage caps in some classes of cases over the past two decades, usually 
as part of an effort at tort reform.142 Legislatures intend such caps as a response to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. For example, New York expresses sentences for misdemeanors in months, see N.Y 
PENAL LAW § 70.15 (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2014), and felonies in years, see N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2014). 
 142. See Michael I. Krauss, A Medical Liability Toolkit, Including ADR, 2 J.L. (1 J. LEGAL 
METRICS) 349 app. a (2012) (summarizing state-by-state damage caps and other laws 
applicable to medical liability); Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 69, at 354 (discussing 
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the perceived problem of “runaway juries” that award apparently outrageous sums.143 
Several scholars have studied the effect of such damage caps on both actual awards 
and settlement amounts.144 Caps are obviously effective in reducing the prevalence 
of exceptionally high awards because they prohibit awards in excess of a certain 
amount. Scholars have also identified two unintended effects, however. First, juries 
limited by the cap in a particular category of awards tend to compensate by awarding 
more in another category.145 For example, juries confronting caps on pain and 
suffering awards appear to be inclined to award more in punitive damages.146 Second, 
caps create anchors that increase awards in cases that would otherwise produce small 
awards.147 This effect even extends to parties who are settling a dispute.148 So 
influential are damage caps that many have suggested that juries should not be 
informed of them, lest they have unintended effects on damage awards.149 
The research on anchoring predicts that damage caps will influence damage 
awards. Each of the theoretical accounts of how anchoring works predicts that 
damage caps will increase awards in low-value cases.150 If jurors are simply 
cognitively lazy, they are apt to use the anchor as a starting point and adjust 
downward.151 This adjustment is apt to be inadequate for cases that would otherwise 
produce an award that is a fraction of the cap, so exposure to the cap will produce a 
                                                                                                                 
 
the caps that Alabama, Florida, and Nevada implement by allowing punitive damages only up 
to a certain multiple of the compensatory damages); Joseph Sanders, Reforming General 
Damages: A Good Tort Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 115, 129–43 (2008) 
(discussing damage caps); Studdert et al., supra note 7, at 63–66 (briefly summarizing the 
genesis, shortcomings, and consequences of damage caps). 
 143. See Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 69, at 366 (“[C]ourts and legislatures alike 
have pursued tort reform efforts largely aimed at reining in what are perceived to be juries out 
of control. . . . One proposed method for reigning in damage award amounts is to limit, or cap, 
the amount that can be awarded in punitive damages.”) 
 144. See generally, e.g., Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Damages 
Statutes: A Proposed Alternative, 20 J. LEGIS. 191 (1994) (arguing that, in some cases, limiting 
damage awards can inhibit the purpose of punitive damages, such as deterrence); Jacqueline 
Perczek, On Efficiency, Punishment, Deterrence, and Fairness: A Survey of Punitive Damages 
Law and a Proposed Jury Instruction, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 825 (1993). 
 145. See Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 69, at 356. Although damage caps typically 
limit awards to selected categories of damages—usually noneconomic damages or punitive 
damages—at least one state has a comprehensive cap that includes all categories of damage 
awards in medical cases. See Krauss, supra note 142, at 374 (citing VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.01-581.15 (2011)). 
 146. See Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 69, at 366. 
 147. Id. at 361; see also Ronen Avraham & Álvaro Bustos, The Unexpected Effects of Caps 
on Non-Economic Damages, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 291, 291 (2010) (“[W]hile caps always 
reduce the recoveries of plaintiffs with large claims, caps may increase recoveries of plaintiffs 
with low claims compared to their recoveries in states with no caps.” (emphasis in original)); 
Hinsz & Indahl, supra note 69, at 1006. 
 148. See Orr & Guthrie, supra note 52, at 611. 
 149. See Michael S. Kang, Comment, Don’t Tell Juries About Statutory Damage Caps: 
The Merits of Nondisclosure, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 480–86 (1999) (explaining the various 
effects of disclosing the damage cap to jurors). 
 150. See Orr & Guthrie, supra note 52, at 605–11. 
 151. Id. 
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higher award. Similarly, if jurors initially attempt to determine whether the case is 
worth more or less than the cap, they will consider the features of the case that 
suggest it would merit a high award.152 Even if jurors reject the notion that the case 
is worth more than the cap, their attention has been drawn to those aspects of the case 
that suggest it would merit a high award. Finally, and we believe most plausibly, the 
cap provides jurors a sense of scale. Jurors contemplating an award of $10,000 will 
learn that cases of this type could be worth fifty times as much, which might make 
the $10,000 award seem inadequate. In short, damage caps are exactly the kind of 
anchor apt to have a large effect on judgment. 
It comes as little surprise to researchers that damage caps have a large effect on 
awards provided by juries,153 but what about judges? Although no previous research 
on the influence of damage caps on judges exists, the concerns that scholars have 
raised about the influence of damage caps assumes that judges are immune from any 
such effects. The reform efforts all involve blinding juries to the existence of anchors 
or giving judges greater control over damage awards.154 Unlike jurors, however, 
judges cannot remain ignorant of the damage caps. If damage caps have a powerful 
effect on jurors’ damage awards, they seem likely to affect judges as well. 
1. Methods and Materials 
To determine whether damage caps influence judges, we conducted an 
experiment involving 115 Canadian trial judges and 65 newly elected trial judges in 
New York State. The Canadian judges were attending an annual conference 
organized by the National Judicial Institute in Canada in 2010, 2011, and 2013. The 
conference is held each year for judges who have served between five and ten years 
(which they refer to as their “sophomore” years). Judges are not obliged to attend, 
but each year the week-long conference draws roughly 40 judges. The judges at the 
conference attend each of the sessions. Our session was entitled “How Judges 
Decide” in 2010 and “The Working of the Judicial Mind” in 2011 and 2013. We did 
not ask these judges their political affiliation. Of the 111 judges who informed us of 
their gender, 51 (or 46%) were female. For the 25 (22%) of the judges from Quebec, 
the materials were translated into French. 
Canada is an ideal jurisdiction in which to test the influence of damage caps on 
trial judges. In 1978, the Canadian Supreme Court, in a trilogy of cases, imposed a 
cap of $100,000 on noneconomic damage awards in civil cases.155 The court 
explicitly indicated that the cap must be adjusted for inflation as measured by the 
Bank of Canada inflation index on a monthly basis.156 The existence of the cap is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 605–08. 
 154. See Kang, supra note 149, at 481–86. 
 155. Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 (Can.); Arnold v. Teno, [1978] 
2 S.C.R. 287 (Can.); Thornton v. Prince George Sch. Dist. No. 57, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267 (Can.). 
 156. D. BRUCE GARROW & KATHERINE L. AYRE, CONFERENCE ON INT’L AVIATION 
LIABILITY & INS., THE RECOVERY OF NON-PECUNIARY DAMAGES IN CANADA: THE CAP ON 
RECOVERY, JURY TRIALS, AND OTHER UNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS FOR GENERAL DAMAGE 
AWARDS 4 (2009) (“In Canada, general damage awards for pain and suffering are currently 
capped at $100,000 and indexed to inflation.”). 
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well known to Canadian trial judges. Because of the monthly adjustment, however, 
the judges have a rough idea of the amount of the cap, but likely do not know the 
precise amount. 
Because we could not realistically manipulate the existence of the cap, or even its 
amount, we instead varied whether we informed the judges of the precise amount or 
not. We presented judges with a case that we expected would produce a nonpecuniary 
award between $30,000 and $50,000—well below the cap. The materials described 
the case as arising from an automobile accident. The defendant was a large 
package-delivery company. The plaintiff was “a 31-year-old male software 
programmer” who was injured by a truck driven “erratically” by one of the 
defendant’s drivers. The defendant admitted that it was liable. The judges were told 
that the parties had settled all claims for medical expenses and economic losses, 
including lost wages. This meant that the only issue for the judges in this bench trial 
was to determine the appropriate compensatory damage award for pain and suffering. 
The materials described the plaintiff’s symptoms in some detail: 
The evidence concerning the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s 
residual symptoms was reasonably clear. Shortly after the accident (it is 
now approximately four years later), the plaintiff was diagnosed with 
cervical and thoracic strain and a severe concussion. The effects of the 
concussion persisted for about a year, during which time the plaintiff 
experienced memory problems. The plaintiff suffered no other cognitive 
problems and the memory problems have not recurred. 
Although the plaintiff’s doctors originally concluded that he would 
recover fully within about a year, the symptoms resulting from the 
cervical and thoracic strain gradually plateaued. The plaintiff still has 
stiffness in his neck, which is annoying and causes him to experience 
severe headaches that are sometimes debilitating. The plaintiff also 
experiences numbness in his left hand if he works at the computer for 
more than a few hours at a stretch. 
The plaintiff’s job requires that he use a computer for several hours a 
day. Only the more severe headaches cause him to lose any notable time 
at work. He manages to work through the less severe headaches with the 
assistance of over-the-counter pain medication and the numbness in his 
left hand dissipates if he takes a short break. He testified that his pain 
makes it hard for him to function as a parent for his two children, making 
him short-tempered and tired. He complained that he is often unable to 
help his children with their homework or play sports with them. 
Although his doctors have not identified any specific physical injury 
as the cause of the plaintiff’s symptoms, he might have suffered some 
slight brachial nerve damage during the accident. Doctors expect that his 
stiffness, headaches, and numbness will persist. 
For half of the judges, the materials indicated that the defendant contended “that 
the injuries are not serious and do not warrant a significant damage award.” The 
materials then asked the judges, “How much would you award the plaintiff for pain 
and suffering?” For the other half of the judges, we included an additional sentence. 
In 2010, the additional sentence stated: “The defendant also reminded you that an 
award of noneconomic damages cannot exceed the cap imposed by the Canadian 
Supreme Court, which is currently $332,236.” In 2011, we included the same 
sentence for half of the judges, except that we indicated that the plaintiff (rather than 
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the defendant) provided the reminder, and we also updated the amount to $342,535. 
In 2013, the materials reminded the judges of the cap (then updated to $367,160) but 
did not attribute the reminder about the cap to either party. 
We also gave a similar set of materials to 65 newly elected trial judges in New 
York State. New York does not have a damage cap akin to the Canadian limitation, 
but for half of the judges, the materials added the following: “Further suppose that 
the parties have stipulated that a statutory damage cap for common-carrier 
defendants of $750,000 applies in this instance. Thus, you may not award more than 
$750,000.” These judges had no previous judicial experience and were attending an 
annual conference for new judges in New York. Among the 63 judges who identified 
their gender, 35% were female. Among the 62 who identified their political 
orientation, 26% were Republicans and 74% were Democrats. 
2. Results 
Overall, the reference to the damage cap influenced the Canadian judges. The 
median award among the Canadian judges who learned about the cap was $85,000, 
as opposed to $57,500 among those who did not.157 This difference was statistically 
significant.158 This effect was driven almost entirely by the variation in which the 
defendant mentioned the cap.159 
Table 2. Median award by condition (in thousands of dollars) and sample size 
Party who identifies damage cap Condition 
  No reference to cap Cap referenced 
Canada 
Defendant 45.0 (19) 100.0 (26) 
No attribution 55.0 (15) 60.0 (16) 
Plaintiff 87.5 (14) 97.5 (22) 
Total 57.5 (48) 85.0 (64) 
New York No attribution 100.0 (28) 250.0 (30) 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. Three judges did not respond; 2 of these judges were in the condition in which the 
plaintiff referred to the damage cap, and 1 was in the condition in which the reference to the 
damage cap was unattributed. 
 158. Using the Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.01. The studies involving damage awards 
generally produced positively skewed distributions of awards with some high outliers, making 
untransformed parametric statistical analysis unreliable. We therefore report the more stable 
median awards, rather than the means. When we compare only two samples, we use the 
Mann-Whitney rank-sum test as our test statistic. When multiple conditions were compared 
or when we tested for the influence of demographic factors, however, we transformed the data, 
analyzing the square root of each award rather than the raw award. 
 159. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the square root of the awards on the anchor 
condition and each of the three versions reveals a significant main effect of version (F(2, 106) 
= 5.52, p = 0.005) and a significant interaction (F(2,106) = 4.84, p < 0.01). 
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The 64 male and 43 female judges did not provide significantly different awards, 
nor did the anchor affect them differently.160 The 25 French-speaking and the 90 
English-speaking judges likewise did not provide different awards, and neither did 
they react differently to the anchor.161 
The effect of the anchor was even more pronounced among the new New York 
judges. Those who learned of the damage cap awarded a median of $250,000, as 
compared to $100,000 among those who did not learn about it, which was a 
significant difference.162 None of the judges awarded more than $750,000, and hence 
the damage cap did not meaningfully constrain the judges—instead, it acted as an 
anchor that increased awards. 
Among the judges in New York, gender and political orientation had some effect 
on awards. The damage cap influenced the female judges more than male judges. 
The 39 male judges awarded a median of $100,000, as compared to $137,500 among 
the 18 female judges. The anchor also seemed to have a greater effect on the female 
judges: male judges awarded a median of $50,000 in the no-anchor condition and 
$200,000 in the anchor condition, while female judges awarded a median of 
$100,000 in the no-anchor condition and $400,000 in the anchor condition. Both 
gender and the interaction of gender and anchoring were marginally significant.163 
The 42 judges who identified themselves as Democrats awarded a median of 
$150,000, as compared to $100,000 among the 13 judges who identified themselves 
as Republicans. The anchor had a greater effect on the Republican judges: 
Democratic judges awarded a median of $100,000 in the no-anchor condition and 
$150,000 in the anchor condition, while Republican judges awarded a median of 
$25,000 in the no-anchor condition and $450,000 in the anchor condition. The main 
effect of political orientation was not significant,164 but an interaction between the 
anchoring condition and party affiliation was statistically significant.165 
3. Discussion 
References to damage caps affected the judges in our study. Telling judges not to 
award more than the cap led them to award more than when no reference was made 
to that cap. Because the Canadian judges were already aware of the existence of the 
cap, the effect must have arisen from increasing its salience. Because the case is 
worth so much less than the cap, the judges who were not reminded of it were likely 
not thinking about it. But when the materials highlighted the cap, judges became 
aware of the scale on which they were making their assessment. The cap made the 
small award that they were considering seem paltry relative to the available range. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. F’s < 1.00, p’s > 0.5. 
 161. F’s < 1.00, p’s > 0.5. 
 162. Using the Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.005. 7 judges did not respond; 4 of these judges 
were in the no-anchor condition, and 3 were in the anchor condition. 
 163. F(1, 53) = 3.60, p = 0.06 and F(1, 53) = 3.60, p = 0.06. This analysis was conducted 
on a square root of the awards, as the distribution of the awards was positively skewed. 
 164. F(1, 52) = 0.00, p > 0.5. This analysis was also conducted on the square root of the 
awards. 
 165. F(1, 52) = 6.04, p < 0.02. 
724 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:695 
 
The mechanism by which we identified the anchor, however, could have 
inadvertently signaled to the judges that the case might be worth more than they 
otherwise would have thought. The anchoring effect occurred largely in the version 
in which the defendant referred to the cap. The cap had less influence when the 
plaintiff mentioned it and when the reference was unattributed. The defendant’s 
statement that the award could not exceed the cap might have implied that the 
defendant feared that the case was worth much more than the cap. Although we 
provided judges with most of the information about the nature of the injury that they 
would have had in a real case, the materials are naturally somewhat less detailed. The 
judges were also apt to have been less motivated to measure the plaintiff’s damages 
accurately than they would have been in a real case and might have been looking for 
a simple cue to approximate its value. Therefore, the defendant’s reminder might 
have led the judges to assume that the injuries were more serious than they otherwise 
would have thought. The plaintiff’s reminder, on the other hand, might have seemed 
self-interested and thus less credible than the defendant’s, so it understandably had 
less influence on the judges. 
Nevertheless, we believe that, as a normative matter, the judges should not have 
been influenced by any reference to the damage cap, regardless of its source. The 
facts provided the judges with enough information to determine an appropriate award 
without relying on an offhand remark. We believe that the results reflect an 
unfortunate influence of anchoring. 
C. Study 3: Order Effects 
The order or sequence in which information is learned or tasks are performed can 
alter judgment.166 The sequence in which a judge sentences offenders provides 
another possible source of misleading anchors. Just as Frederick and Mochon found 
that the order in which subjects estimated the average weight of animals affected 
their judgments,167 so too might the order in which judges assign sentences affect the 
relative length of their sentences.168 A short sentence for a minor offense might serve 
as an anchor that shortens a subsequent sentence imposed for a more serious crime. 
Similarly, a long sentence imposed for a more serious crime might serve as an anchor 
that lengthens a subsequent sentence assigned to a less serious crime. Such a result 
would provide convincing evidence that anchors influence judgment even when they 
are wholly irrelevant. Obviously, a sentence assigned to an unrelated defendant for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. See S. E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 258, 271 (1946) (demonstrating that the sequence in which a person’s traits are 
revealed influences our perception of that person and explaining that “the first terms set up in 
most subjects a direction which then exerts a continuous effect on the latter terms” (emphasis 
omitted)); see also Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, The Last Word in 
Court—A Hidden Disadvantage for the Defense, 29 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 705 (2005) 
(presenting evidence that defense attorneys might anchor their own recommendations on 
prosecutors’ recommendations, which are presented first). 
 167. Frederick & Mochon, supra note 61, at 126. 
 168. See Critcher & Gilovich, supra note 45, at 248 (concluding that “incidental numbers 
present in the environment influenced participants’ estimates of uncertain values”). 
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an unrelated crime provides a judge with no meaningful insight into the appropriate 
sentence for a subsequent case. 
Anchoring is not the only possible extraneous consequence of sentence order. 
Judges might also suffer from a contrast effect. The contrast effect is the tendency to 
base judgments on comparisons with similar examples even though the judgments 
were intended to be independent.169 The contrast effect produces the opposite result 
from anchoring on the influence of serial judgments; anchoring suggests that the 
initial judgment will pull the second closer, while the contrast effect suggests that the 
first judgment will push the second further away.170 
In our previous research on anchoring, we found anchoring effects rather than 
contrast effects, but other research suggests that contrast effects might occur in some 
circumstances. If contrast effects influence sentencing in judges, then reviewing a 
minor crime might make a more serious crime seem even worse in contrast, thereby 
producing a longer sentence for the more serious crime. Likewise, reviewing a 
serious crime might make a minor crime seem even less serious, thereby producing 
a shorter sentence for the less serious crime. Research by Kelman and his colleagues 
has demonstrated the influence of the contrast effect and the influence of scaling in 
lay assessments of criminal cases.171 In their study, mock jurors were more likely to 
sentence a hypothetical defendant to community service rather than jail if an 
inadequate community service sentence was presented as a third option.172 Other 
research, however, has failed to uncover related contrast effects in similar 
circumstances,173 suggesting that the influence of contrast effects on assessments of 
criminal cases is not a robust phenomenon. 
One previous study suggests that sentence order influences judges. Research by 
Danziger and his colleagues found that decisions made by an Israeli parole court 
were different during different times of the day.174 This court granted only 20% of 
the applications for parole made immediately before lunch, but the success rate 
soared to 60% for the first case after lunch. The success rate declined again in the 
lead up to the court’s afternoon break, and rose again after that break.175 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. See Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and 
Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281, 281 (1992) (“Contrast effects are 
ubiquitous in perception and judgment.”); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich 
& Chris Guthrie, Altering Attention in Adjudication, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1586, 1597–609 (2013) 
(documenting the influence of contrast effects in judges). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, 
Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov, Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. 
L. REV. 1153 (2002) (describing research showing that people often make comparative 
judgments about fault in legal settings, even when absolute judgments are required). 
 170. See Frederick & Mochon, supra note 61, at 127–28 (“[P]rior judgments can affect 
respondents’ interpretation of numeric labels even on objective scales.”). 
 171. Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal 
Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 295–97 (1996). 
 172. Id. at 296–97. 
 173. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, The Cognitive Components of 
Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 457, 482 (2003) (finding that the data obtained in this study 
“[did] not show evidence of contrast effects in decision making about the death penalty”). 
 174. See generally Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous 
Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889 (2011). 
 175. Id. 
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researchers interpret these results as evidence that the judges grew hungry or tired, 
encouraging the somewhat easier decision to deny parole (most applicants are 
denied).176 The researchers also provide an alternative account, however, suggesting 
that the judges had an implicit quota for each day;177 having granted parole in a 
number of cases, the judges had to become stingy so as not to exceed their quota as 
the day progressed. Others have argued, however, that the order in which the Israeli 
parole board hears cases is not truly random.178  
The impact of sentence order thus remains uncertain. Judges might be subject to 
anchoring or contrast effects or might resist any such influence. A sentence-order 
effect would be pernicious because each defendant is entitled to be sentenced 
according to the merits of his or her own case. To ascertain whether judges resist this 
influence, we undertook a study of case order. 
1. Methods and Materials 
We studied the effect of case order with three different groups of judges: newly 
appointed military judges,179 judges attending the annual Arizona Judicial 
Conference in 2011,180 and Dutch judges attending a conference sponsored by the 
Dutch Judicial Council in the Netherlands.181 Each of these three groups assessed a 
similar pair of hypothetical cases. One of the cases consisted of an assault or a similar 
battery. We intended this case to constitute the less serious crime. The second case 
consisted of a voluntary manslaughter similar to that used in Study 1, which produced 
an average sentence of 9.7 years The materials provided the judges with the 
following information: “Assume that your court calendar this morning includes the 
sentencing of two defendants: Jones and Smith. Both cases arise from separate 
incidents, but both have pled guilty.” Half of the judges reviewed the less serious 
crime first, and the other half reviewed the more serious crime first. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Keren Weinshall-Margel & John Shapard, Overlooked Factors in the Analysis of 
Parole Decision, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E833, E833 (2011) (arguing “[t]he phenomenon 
of favorable decisions peaking after a meal break is likely an artifact of the order of case 
presentation” and contending that such breaks are not random). 
 179. These judges were nearing the completion of a training course for newly assigned trial 
judges, and hence were inexperienced judges. As part of their training, they were required to 
participate in a session identified as reviewing “judicial decision making.” For these judges, 
completing the survey was compulsory (and indeed, the response rate was 100%), although 
each judge was afforded the option of withdrawing his or her survey from further analysis 
(anonymously). The survey was presented at both the 2010 and 2011 sessions of this 
conference, and the results were aggregated for analysis. 
 180. The Arizona Judicial Conference is an annual conference attended by most of the 
judges in Arizona. The data come from a breakout session entitled, “How Judges Think,” 
which was optional for the judges attending the conference. 
 181. This was a day-long conference sponsored by the Dutch Judicial Council and was 
optional for the judges. The conference was entitled, “Judgment Day,” and the materials for 
this conference were translated into Dutch. 
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a. Military Materials 
Although we used the same fact pattern for the severe crime in all three groups, 
the less severe crime varied to suit the jurisdiction. For the military judges, the less 
severe crime consisted of threatening with an unloaded weapon. The facts were as 
follows: 
Jones pled guilty to simple assault with an unloaded firearm; as part 
of an agreement, he would not be prosecuted for any other crime related 
to this incident. The act occurred when Jones got into a loud argument 
with another service member while on the base at which they were both 
stationed. The source of the argument is unclear, but may have involved 
an accusation by Jones that the service member owed him some money. 
Jones walked away from the argument only to return a few minutes later 
with a service pistol. He pointed the pistol at the service member and 
threatened to shoot him if he did not pay. At a moment of inattention, 
bystanders wrestled Jones to the ground and removed the pistol, which 
was not loaded. Jones asserts that he checked to ensure that the weapon 
was not loaded before he pointed it at the service member. 
Jones is 19 and has served for 6 months. He has not had any other 
disciplinary problems. His service record is otherwise unremarkable to 
date. He has agreed to accept a dishonorable discharge, and the only 
remaining issue is the length of confinement. Simple assault with an 
unloaded weapon carries a maximum sentence of 3 years of confinement. 
For the military judges, the more severe crime remained involuntary manslaughter 
and involved another service member. The materials also indicated that this 
defendant had pled guilty and agreed to a dishonorable discharge. Involuntary 
manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of 15 years in the military justice system. 
The materials provided the following background about the defendant: 
Smith is 23 years old and has served for over three years. He has been 
reprimanded once in the past for an incident arising from a bar fight while 
he was intoxicated. His service record is otherwise clean, but 
unremarkable. He served for 18 months in Afghanistan with his unit. 
Sentencing in a military court-martial is not conducted entirely by the trial 
judge.182 Both the jury and the judge independently recommend a sentence. The 
judge then recommends the less severe of the two sentences to the general in 
command of the unit, who may depart from the recommendation either upward or 
downward. In the case of the military judges, we were thus studying an important 
sentence recommendation, rather than the sentence actually imposed. 
We did not ask the military judges for political affiliation. We did not ask for their 
experience as judges either because all were new to the position; but all had 
significant experience in the military.183 We asked their gender, but because only 17 
                                                                                                                 
 
 182. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, A21, at 72 (2012) (“Sentencing 
in courts-martial may be by the military judge or members.”). 
 183. The judges had an average of 18.7 years of experience in the military (the median was 
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of the judges (24%) were female, we did not analyze gender differences for these 
judges. A total of 71 military judges completed the sentencing questions:184 35 in 
2010 and 40 in 2011. 
b. Arizona Materials 
The materials for the Arizona judges were similar to those used with the military 
judges, although the less severe crime differed slightly. Because the analogous crime 
in Arizona is punished much more severely, we had to eliminate the use of the 
firearm and substitute conduct that would still draw a similar range of sentences.185 
The facts we used are described below: 
Jones pled guilty to aggravated assault under A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(5) 
(assault that occurs in the private home of the victim). The incident 
occurred when Jones got into a loud argument with a coworker while the 
two were leaving their workplace (an office) at the end of the day. The 
source of the argument involved an accusation by Jones that his coworker 
owed him some money. Jones apparently followed the coworker home, 
waited until the coworker unlocked the door, and pushed him inside. 
Jones, who is several inches taller than his coworker, shoved the victim 
around inside his living room and threatened to “beat him badly” if he 
did not pay. A neighbor overheard the shouting, and called the police, 
who arrived quickly and arrested Jones. Jones asserts that he did not 
intend to hurt his victim, and only wanted the money he was owed. 
Nevertheless, the victim suffered a mild concussion. 
We also varied the defendant’s background slightly to avoid references to his 
military record: 
Jones is 19, unmarried, and has no previous arrests. He was employed 
as a full-time administrative assistant until the incident and was living on 
his own in an apartment. His parents both testified at his hearing that he 
had never been in trouble before. His mother stated that she felt that Jones 
was worried about money because his company had been threatening to 
close his office and lay everyone off. 
In Arizona, the judge assigned to the case imposes the sentence. Arizona, 
however, has somewhat more elaborate substantive restrictions in the form of limited 
maximum and minimum sentences and a presumptive sentence. In Arizona, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
18 years). 
 184. Due to an error in creating the surveys in 2011, 4 judges sentenced only the 
manslaughter defendant. These judges were kept in the analysis among judges who sentenced 
the manslaughter defendant first, but they provided no data on the threat. 
 185. The same crime in Arizona would constitute aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, 
which is a class 3 felony. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1204(A)(2) (2010). It carries a 
presumptive sentence of 3.5 years. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(D) (2010). In light of this 
fact, we changed the crime to an assault that occurs in the private home of the victim. 
§ 13-1204(A)(5). 
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crime at issue is a class 6 felony.186 As the materials noted, “[f]or first time-offenders 
with no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it carries a minimum sentence of 
0.5 years, a maximum of 1.5 years, and a presumptive sentence of 1 year.”187 
The circumstances of the voluntary manslaughter were identical to those in Study 
1, above. In Arizona, this crime would be a class 2 felony,188 which, for this 
defendant’s background, would carry a minimum sentence of 7 years, a maximum 
of 21 years, and a presumptive sentence of 10.5 years.189 
A total of 39 Arizona judges completed the survey. These judges had an average 
of 11.5 years of experience as judges (a median of 9.5 years), ranging from 0 to 35 
years (only 37 reported their experience). Of the 38 who reported their gender, 15 
(39%) were female. Of the 37 judges who reported their political affiliation, 18 (46%) 
identified themselves as Republicans and 19 (54%) as Democrats.190 The group 
included 8 appellate judges (out of 38 who responded to the demographic page—we 
assumed the individual who did not complete the demographic questions was also a 
judge), who were included in the analysis. 
c. Dutch Materials 
The materials for the Dutch judges were identical to those of the Arizona judges 
in terms of their facts. We changed the names of the defendants to Jasperen and 
Smulders instead of Jones and Smith, respectively. We also anticipated that many of 
the Dutch judges would insist upon a suspended sentence for the lesser crime, so we 
offered them that option. For both the less severe and more severe crimes, the Dutch 
judges could impose a suspended sentence, a sentence to be served, or both. 
A total of 62 Dutch judges completed the questions on sentencing.191 These judges 
had an average of 13.2 years of experience as judges (a median of 12 years), ranging 
from just under 1 year to 27 years. Of the 62 who reported their gender, 23 (39%) 
were female. We did not ask the Dutch judges questions concerning their political 
affiliation. The sample included 17 appellate judges (including 3 judges from the 
High Court). 
2. Results 
a. Military Judges 
The order of sentence influenced the military judges. Table 3a, below, presents 
the average sentence in each condition. Judges who sentenced the manslaughter 
                                                                                                                 
 
 186. § 13-1204(D) (“Aggravated assault pursuant to subsection A, paragraph . . . 5 . . . is a 
class 6 felony.”). 
 187. See § 13-702 (D). 
 188. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(C) (2010). 
 189. See § 13-702 (D). 
 190. Twenty-three judges identified themselves as independent, unaffiliated, or simply did 
not respond to our question about political affiliation: “Which of the two major political parties 
in the United States most closely matches your own political beliefs?” 
 191. Sixty-three judges were in attendance at the conference; only 1 did not complete the 
sentencing questions. 
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case first provided longer sentences than the judges who sentenced the threat first 
(1.61 years versus 1.15 years). Likewise, judges who sentenced the threat first 
provided shorter sentences than judges who sentenced the manslaughter first (6.65 
years versus 8.52 years). Both effects were statistically significant.192 The result is 
consistent with an anchoring effect. The first sentence effectively acted as an 
anchor for the judges, even though the cases were clearly labeled as independent 
crimes. 
Table 3a. Mean sentence by condition among military judges 
Crime First crime: mean sentence (and n) Test of difference 
 Threat Manslaughter t-statistic p-value 
Threat 1.15 (31) 1.61 (40) 2.65 0.01 
Manslaughter 6.65 (31) 8.52 (44) 2.46 0.02 
b. Arizona Judges 
Sentencing order influenced the Arizona judges, albeit in a more limited way. 
Table 3b, below, presents the average sentence in each condition. As was the case 
with the military judges, Arizona judges who sentenced the manslaughter case first 
provided longer sentences than the judges who sentenced the threat first (0.82 years 
versus 0.56 years); this difference was statistically significant. Assigning the 
lengthy sentence to the manslaughter defendant seemed to anchor the judges, 
biasing their sentences for the less severe crime. We did not observe a similar effect 
on the manslaughter sentences, however. Judges provided virtually identical 
sentences for manslaughter, regardless of which defendant they sentenced first. 
Owing to the relatively small sample size, we did not assess the influence of the 
demographic variables. 
Table 3b. Mean sentence by condition among Arizona judges 
Crime First crime: mean sentence (and n) Test of difference 
 Battery Manslaughter t-statistic p-value 
Battery 0.56 (18) 0.82 (21) 2.13 0.04 
Manslaughter 9.06 (18) 9.12 (21) 0.12 0.91 
c. Dutch Judges 
Table 3c, below, presents the average sentence in each condition. Despite 
differences between the two types of judges and the jurisdictions, the results are 
comparable to those of the Arizona judges. The order influenced the sentences judges 
assigned to the less serious crime but not to the more serious crime. 
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Table 3c. Mean sentence by condition among Dutch judges 
Crime 
Sentence type 
(and n) Condition Test of difference 
  Battery 
(1st) 
Manslaughter
(1st) 
t-
statistic 
p- 
value 
Battery 
Unconditional (62) 0.05 0.24 1.98 0.05* 
Conditional (62) 0.09 0.52 3.20 0.002* 
Total (62) 0.14 0.76 3.71 0.0004* 
Manslaughter 
Unconditional (62) 5.13 5.43 0.49 0.62 
Conditional (62) 0.66 1.03 0.96 0.34 
Total (62) 5.79 6.46 1.05 0.31 
*Statistically significant 
3. Discussion 
Sentence order influenced the judges. Even though the cases clearly had nothing 
to do with each other, sentencing one defendant influenced the sentencing of the 
next. Sentencing a defendant to roughly 1 year in prison made a lengthy sentence 
seem excessive to the judges, even though the second case was a serious one. 
Additionally, sentencing a defendant to a lengthy sentence made a short sentence 
seem too short by comparison. We saw no evidence of the contrast effect. Instead, 
anchoring prevailed. 
The effect was more pronounced on the less serious case than the more serious 
one. In all three versions, sentencing the more serious crime first raised the sentence 
of the less serious crime, but the more serious crime was unaffected in two of the 
three variations. We are not certain why this occurred. Possibly, the judges felt that 
they had more discretion to raise the somewhat short sentence for the less serious 
crime than they had to lower the sentence for the more serious crime.193 
Because the two crimes are independent, it is hard to see how they could have 
provided relevant information about each other. Perhaps judges assumed that, despite 
our assertion to the contrary, crimes tend to be batched together in terms of severity. 
We think not, however. Judges are certainly used to the idea that different unrelated 
cases appear before them in the same session. The most plausible account of the 
results is anchoring. 
D. Study 4: Debiasing 
In experiment after experiment, we find that judges rely on numeric anchors, even 
when doing so is normatively indefensible. In some studies, one might be able to 
identify an appropriate reason to rely on the numeric reference point, but the weight 
of evidence across the preceding studies (as well as the experiments on anchoring in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 193. See also Bushway et al., supra note 98, at 298 (suggesting that anchoring might be 
more effective at increasing sentences than decreasing sentences). 
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judges that we have previously reported elsewhere) suggests that anchors distort 
judges’ judgment.194 In particular, the pattern of results is most consistent with the 
account of anchoring developed by Frederick and Mochon.195 That is, numeric 
reference points distort judges’ sense of scale. As an example, less serious injuries 
do not necessarily seem more serious when judges learn of (relatively) high damage 
caps, but their sense of where the injury fits on the scale is affected. 
This account of anchoring suggests a mechanism for producing judgments that 
are less heavily affected by anchoring. If anchoring distorts judges’ sense of scale, 
then reliable judgments depend upon establishing a reliable sense of scale. In civil 
cases, giving judges a reliable sense of how to convert injuries into dollars might 
ameliorate the influence of anchors. 
1. Methods and Materials 
To determine whether providing a reliable scale can thwart the influence of 
anchors, we asked 242 judges attending a statewide judicial conference in Ohio to 
assess a case involving a serious personal injury. These judges had an average of 
14.2 years of experience, ranging from newly appointed to 42 years of judicial 
service, with a median of 14 years. Of the 239 judges who informed us of their 
gender, 20% were female. Of the 224 judges who answered our question concerning 
political orientation, 62% were Republicans and 38% were Democrats. 
We constructed six conditions to induce an anchoring effect and then inoculate 
the judges against its influence. One-third of the judges evaluated a scenario in 
which we requested a damage award but provided no anchor; one-third of the 
judges evaluated the same scenario with a low anchor; and one-third of the judges 
evaluated the same scenario with a high anchor. We also created a variation in 
which judges reviewed a discussion of a newspaper article describing three 
reasonable damage awards in other cases. We wanted to test whether reviewing 
this article would serve as a kind of inoculant that would reduce the influence of 
the anchors. Thus, half of the judges also reviewed this inoculant, thereby creating 
a 3 x 2 between-subjects design (low anchor, no anchor, or high anchor crossed 
with either no inoculant or inoculant). 
The injury was one we used in our original experiment on anchoring with federal 
magistrate judges. We described the plaintiff as a 31-year-old school teacher and the 
defendant as a large package-delivery service. The materials indicated that the 
defendant’s employee had been driving one of its trucks erratically and had 
sideswiped the plaintiff. The defendant had admitted liability, and the parties had 
settled economic claims and medical expenses, leaving only the noneconomic 
damages unresolved. The materials described the injury as follows: 
As a result of the accident, the plaintiff broke three ribs and severely 
injured his right arm. He spent a week in the hospital and missed six 
                                                                                                                 
 
 194. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 790–94; Wistrich et al., supra note 82, at 
1291–93. 
 195. Frederick & Mochon, supra note 61, at 124 (“[O]ur theory of scale distortion suggests 
that anchoring effects may also occur because of a shift in the use of the response scale itself and 
not because of any deeper change in the underlying representation of the target being judged.”). 
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weeks of work. The injuries to his right arm were so severe as to require 
amputation. (He was right-handed.) 
. . . .  
The evidence presented at trial included testimony from the 
plaintiff, a young father, that he could no longer play recreational 
softball, or even play catch with his son. Although the plaintiff has 
continued teaching, he testified that doing his job is somewhat more 
difficult, and that he is subject to periodic ridicule by the students. 
Plaintiff also described the severe pain he endured before arriving at 
the hospital, during the surgery to amputate his arm, and during his 
post-surgical therapy. 
The materials created variations for the anchoring conditions by using the 
manipulation we used in a previous study involving administrative law judges.196 
That is, we inserted a statement by the plaintiff into the materials. For the low-anchor 
condition, this statement read as follows: “During his testimony, the plaintiff also 
mentioned as an aside that he recently saw a case on a ‘court television show’ where 
‘a victim like me’ received a ‘$150,000 award.’ You sustained the defendant’s 
objection to this comment as irrelevant.” The high-anchor condition was identical, 
except that it stated the amount as $10 million. The no-anchor condition included the 
same statement, but omitted the dollar amount. For all judges, the materials ended 
by asking: “How much would you award the plaintiff in this case for pain and 
suffering and loss of his right arm?” 
The inoculant consisted of the following additional paragraph inserted after the 
reference to the plaintiff’s testimony and before the call of the question: 
The case reminds you of a recent legal newspaper article discussing 
damage awards upheld on appeal in personal injury cases in Ohio, 
including: a $214,000 award for a plaintiff who had lost a thumb in a 
railroad accident; a $1,050,000 award for a plaintiff who had suffered 
crippling back pain and an amputated leg from a car accident; and an 
$11,000,000 award for a 24 year-old-plaintiff whose injuries made him 
a quadriplegic with severe brain damage. 
We hypothesized that the inoculant would negate the effect of the anchoring by 
giving the judges a reasonable sense of how a variety of personal injury cases with 
varying awards might translate into dollar amounts. 
2. Results 
Of the 242 judges, 226 provided a damage award.197 Table 4, below, reports the 
results. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 196. Guthrie et al., supra note 78, at 1502–03. 
 197. The missing data were distributed fairly evenly through all six cells of the 3 x 2 design: 
3 in the no-inoculant, low-anchor condition; 4 in the no-inoculant, no-anchor condition; 3 in 
the no-inoculant, high-anchor condition; 2 in the inoculant, low-anchor condition; 3 in the 
inoculant, no-anchor condition; and 1 in the inoculant, high-anchor condition. 
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Table 4. Mean, 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile of awards by condition 
Inoculant? 
Anchor 
(and n) Mean 
25th 
percentile Median 
75th 
percentile 
No 
inoculant 
Low (35) 741 225 500 750 
No (36) 1278 325 750 1250 
High (34) 1483 500 1000 2000 
Inoculant 
Low (42) 1079 500 750 1000 
No (37) 1828 750 1000 2500 
High (42) 1841 500 1000 2000 
Statistical tests to assess these effects were made challenging by the highly skewed 
nature of the awards. Although a square root transformation produced a distribution 
that more closely approximated a normal distribution, it was still somewhat skewed. 
We thus conducted both an analysis of the medians, which is robust to outliers and 
skewed data, and an analysis of the square root of the awards. In both cases, we 
regressed awards against a dummy variable for the low-anchor condition; a dummy 
variable for the high-anchor condition; a dummy variable for the inoculant conditions; 
and two interaction terms between the variables for the low anchor, high anchor, and 
inoculant. We report the regression results in Table 5, below. 
Table 5. Regression results for median quantile regression and linear regression on the square 
root of damage awards (in thousands) 
Variable Model 1: Median regression Model 2: Square root 
 
coefficient 
t- 
statistic 
p- 
value coefficient 
t- 
statistic 
p- 
value 
Constant 750 – – 976 – – 
Low anchor -250 3.26 0.001 -263 1.97 0.05 
High anchor 250 3.33 0.001 111 0.83 0.41 
Inoculant 250 3.21 0.002 235 1.79 0.09 
Low x 
inoculant 0 0.00 1.000 -17 0.09 0.93 
High x 
inoculant -250 2.40 0.020 -129 0.70 0.49 
The analysis produced a complex pattern of results. The medians shifted in ways 
that we expected. That is, exposure to the low anchor lowered the median by 
$250,000, and exposure to the high anchor raised the median by $250,000. The 
inoculant had no effect on the influence of the low anchor, but it reduced the 
influence of the high anchor. At the same time, the inoculant increased the median 
damage award. The transformed data, however, show a somewhat different pattern. 
These results suggest that the low anchor influenced the judges’ awards, but the high 
anchor did not. A nonparametric analysis of the comparison between the no-anchor 
and the high-anchor condition did not produce a significant result.198 The inoculant 
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2015] CAN JUDGES MAKE RELIABLE NUMERIC JUDGMENTS? 735 
 
increased awards overall and did not eliminate the influence of the low anchor. 
Because there was no significant effect of the high anchor, the inoculant could not 
eliminate the influence of the high anchor. 
Female judges were more generous than male judges. They provided an overall 
median award of $1,000,000, as compared to a median of $750,000 among male 
judges. This was a marginally statistically significant difference.199 Democratic judges 
provided a median award of $1,000,000, as compared to a median of $750,000 among 
Republican judges, although this difference was not statistically significant.200 Years 
of experience did not significantly correlate with award size.201 None of the 
demographic variables interacted significantly with the influence of the anchor.202 
3. Discussion 
The results suggest that judges find it challenging to convert injuries into awards 
without being influenced by anchoring. Our effort to reduce anchoring by providing 
an inoculant was, at best, only partly successful. The inoculant had no apparent effect 
on the low anchor, although it produced median awards that were identical in the 
high-anchor and no-anchor conditions. The analysis of the transformed data and the 
nonparametric analysis, however, suggest that the high anchor had little or no effect 
on the overall distribution of awards (even though the median award was higher in 
the high-anchor condition). Furthermore, the inoculant did not eliminate the effect of 
the low anchor. The inoculant also had the unintended effect of increasing the size 
of awards. Therefore, although exposing judges to sensible numeric reference points 
might aid their judgment and diminish the distortion of anchoring, such an approach 
would have to be more carefully tailored and might have unintended consequences. 
Some have suggested that case-specific anchors may influence judges less than 
jurors because judges may possess contextual or comparative information about 
damage awards that jurors lack.203 Assuming that such a disparity in 
non-case-specific information exists, it may not be very helpful. First, our 
experiments as a whole suggest that despite their arguably broader exposure to a 
range of non-case-specific damage awards, judges are nevertheless powerfully 
influenced by case-specific anchors. Second, the results of Study 4 indicate that 
contextual or comparative information can itself distort damage awards. The ability 
of non-case-specific information to reduce distortions caused by anchoring may 
depend on the quality of that information and the manner in which it is presented. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 199. Using the Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.06. 
 200. Using the Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.15. 
 201. r = .07 (using the square root of the awards), t(223) = 1.09, p = 0.27. 
 202. This was assessed by regressing the square root of the awards on the dummy variables 
denoting the low- and high-anchor conditions, the three demographic variables (gender, party, 
and years of experience), and the interaction terms. All t statistics for the coefficients for the 
interaction terms were less than 1.0, and all p-values were greater than 0.25. 
 203. Hans & Reyna, supra note 96, at 144 (“[A]nchors presented during trial should have 
a stronger impact on jury assessments than on judge assessments because judges are apt to 
have contextual and comparative information about other cases that may counteract or 
outweigh the impact of anchors presented during trial.”). 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS 
Anchoring is a heuristic that profoundly distorts numerical estimates in a variety 
of settings. As this study—especially taken together with our previous experiments 
on the topic—confirms, American, Canadian, and Dutch judges are not immune. 
Although some of the anchors in these studies arguably had some relevance to the 
underlying case, even hopelessly arbitrary anchors affected the decisions of the judges 
we studied. Without remediation, damage awards and criminal sentences might. 
Remedying the untoward influences of anchors is not an easy task. We tested a 
plausible strategy for overcoming anchoring by embedding an anchor among a set of 
other potential anchors, but the result was not entirely effective. Other studies suggest 
that merely warning people about anchors also does little to avoid their effects.204 
What, then, might be done to minimize or eliminate the impact of irrelevant anchors? 
In previous articles, we suggested steps that might be taken to minimize the 
distortion caused by anchoring. These included attempting to train judges to avoid 
the impact of anchoring,205 prohibiting litigants from mentioning numbers that might 
operate as anchors (such as a damage cap or plaintiff’s ad damnum),206 separating 
decision-making functions,207 requiring explanations for the amount of damages 
awarded or the sentence imposed,208 relying on aggregated data,209 and cabining 
discretion with sentencing guidelines210 and damage schedules.211 
Unless further research uncovers a better inoculant strategy than the one we used 
in this study, minimizing the effect of anchors requires either (1) avoiding them, 
(2) facilitating exposure to meaningful anchors, or (3) restricting judges’ discretion 
in imposing sentences or damages. 
Prohibiting the mention of figures that might serve as anchors seems a promising 
strategy. Some jurisdictions have adopted it.212 A separation of decision-making 
functions serves the same purpose indirectly by ensuring that if an anchor is mentioned 
to a judge acting as a case manager, settlement officer, or evidence gatekeeper, a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 204. Guthrie et al., supra note 78, at 1505–06. 
 205. Guthrie et al., supra note 32, at 38–40. 
 206. See Kang, supra note 149, at 493; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) (2012) 
(prohibiting mention of damage caps to juries in employment discrimination cases). But see 
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew T. Brodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance About 
Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1404 (2005) 
(arguing that “concealing the cap has the potential to undermine the integrity and legitimacy 
of the jury system” and advocating as an alternative remedy “provid[ing] juries with more 
complete knowledge of caps and their context”). 
 207. Guthrie et al., supra note 32 at 42; Wistrich et al., supra note 82, at 1325–27. 
 208. Guthrie et al., supra note 32, at 36–38; Guthrie et al., supra note 78, at 1501, 1504–06. 
 209. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 823. 
 210. Id. at 794. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See, e.g., Reese v. Hersey, 29 A. 907, 908 (Pa. 1894); Porter v. Zenger Milk Co., 7 
A.2d 77, 78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939); see also EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 637, 
639–40 (E.D. Wash. 2011) (“[I]f Plaintiff intends to suggest a specific amount to the jury for 
emotional distress damages, yet fails to supplement its Rule 26 disclosures to provide 
Defendant with a computation of damages, Plaintiff may be foreclosed from suggesting that 
specific amount for emotional distress damages to the jury at trial.”). 
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different judge or a jury acting as the fact finder will be shielded from exposure to it. 
Some of the experiments reported in this Article (particularly Study 3), however, 
suggest that this approach may be too limited. Anchors can arise from contextual 
sources perhaps too numerous and varied to be effectively controlled in this way.213 
Mechanisms to facilitate exposure to meaningful anchors might be promising. 
The legal system includes numerous meaningful, sensible anchors. As the research 
demonstrates, for example, recommendations from prosecutors and defense 
attorneys influence judges.214 If these actors make sensible recommendations, then 
the judges will find them to be stabilizing influences.215 Although parties might abuse 
the insights in this Article to make outrageous requests,216 lawyers’ suggestions as to 
sentences or awards might make for more reliable awards and sentences when both 
parties suggest them. Competing anchors are apt to stabilize awards and sentences.217 
Furthermore, knowing that an adversary will suggest an award or sentence might 
discipline each party into making reasonable suggestions. In civil cases, judges could 
facilitate this by obtaining competing suggestions in the context of settlement 
discussions and permitting bifurcation to allow a defense attorney to suggest an 
anchor without admitting liability.218 
Controlling discretion with sentencing guidelines and damage schedules also can 
minimize anchoring effects. The former are common,219 and the latter are gradually 
gaining acceptance.220 Guidelines and schedules are not likely to eliminate the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 213. See Critcher & Gilovich, supra note 45, at 248 (reporting that “incidental numbers 
present in the environment influenced participants’ estimates of uncertain values”). 
 214. See Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 94, at 1547–49. 
 215. Lawyers, however, are not immune to the influence of anchoring either; actors might 
anchor on each other. One study suggests that defense attorneys who make their 
recommendations after prosecutors might adjust their recommendations toward those offered 
by the prosecutor. See generally Englich et al., supra note 166. 
 216. See Don Rushing, Linda Lane & Erin Bosman, Anchors Away: Attacking Dollar 
Suggestions for Non-Economic Damages in Closings, 70 DEF. COUNSEL J. 378, 379–81 (2003). 
 217. Studies in which multiple anchors are available suggest that counteranchors might be 
effective. See generally Glen Whyte & James K. Sebenius, The Effect of Multiple Anchors on 
Anchoring in Individual and Group Judgment, 69 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 75 (1997). One study in a legal setting in which researchers used competing 
anchors, unfortunately, did not compare versions in which the defendant did not offer an 
anchor to ones in which the defendant did offer one. Malouff & Schutte, supra note 69, at 
493–96. A more recent study suggests that defense attorneys can blunt the anchoring effect of 
a plaintiff’s demand by offering a counteranchor, although doing so might also increase the 
defendant’s chances of being found liable. John Campbell, Bernard Chao, Christopher 
Robertson & David Yokum, Countering the Plaintiff's Anchor: Jury Simulations To Evaluate 
Damages Arguments (Arizona Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 14-25, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2470066. 
 218. See Randy Wilson, Do You Suggest a Number?, ADVOCATE, Winter 2011, at 107, 107 
(“The defense attorney is in . . . a quandary. To suggest . . . anything might be perceived as a 
concession of liability.”). 
 219. See generally NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 130. 
 220. See, e.g., Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing an 
award of damages for loss of consortium and directing the trial court to determine the average 
ratio of loss-of-consortium damages because the trial court failed to consider awards in similar 
cases); Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640, 635, 654–62 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) 
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distortion caused by anchoring, but these efforts will reduce the variability of these 
judgments by constraining their range.221 Such guidelines themselves might also act 
as anchors, although judges could minimize their influence by first assessing 
qualitative factors and only consulting the guidelines after identifying a tentative 
sentence.222 Many such existing devices, however, may leave too much room for 
discretion and hence for distortion. There is, for example, a continuum of strictness 
along which the states employing sentencing guidelines may be arrayed.223 Those 
that are most strict may still permit some individualization and thereby also permit 
some distortion but may confine the latter within acceptable bounds.224 States with 
more relaxed guidelines, on the other hand, might tolerate too much distortion. The 
post-Booker225 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines may fall nearer the relaxed end of the 
continuum than those of some states, such as Minnesota.226 A similar continuum 
exists with respect to damage schedules.227 
                                                                                                                 
 
(determining whether a damage award “deviated materially from what would be reasonable 
compensation” by comparing it to previous awards in similar cases (citation omitted)). See 
also Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 763, 775–76 (1995) (suggesting that jurors be provided with a chart summarizing damage 
awards in cases involving similarly situated plaintiffs); Shari Seidman Diamond, Michael J. 
Saks & Stephan Landsman, Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of 
Variability and Ways To Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 321–22 (1998) 
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a set of damage awards made by previous juries in similar cases); Roselle L. Wissler, Allen J. 
Hart & Michael J. Saks, Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, 
Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 817 (1999) (recommending that parties or the 
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distributions to juries for guidance in reaching their general damages awards”). 
 221. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 86, at 1236–37. 
 222. Judge Mark Bennett has suggested this procedure. See Bennett, supra note 74, at 530 
(“I suggest that the sentencing judge should review and study the information in a PSR’s 
non-Guidelines § 3553(a) first.”). 
 223. See generally NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 130. 
 224. See Sanders, supra note 142, at 149 (“Here we face a tradeoff. The proposals that are 
likely to have the greatest impact in reducing horizontal inequity are the ones that most clearly 
limit jury discretion, and those that leave the most discretion in the hands of jurors are likely 
to leave the most residual inequities.”). 
 225. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (concluding that the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines are “effectively advisory”). 
 226. See generally Mustard, supra note 19 (noting that race and gender disparities persist 
despite sentencing guidelines); Lydia Brashear Tiede, Disparity in Federal District Court 
Sentencing, LAW & CTS. (Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, Columbia, S.C.), Summer 2012, at 29, 32 
(“[I]n several of the circuits, judges chose to sentence within the Guideline ranges over 70% 
of the time, while in other circuits . . . judges stayed within the Guideline ranges for only 35% 
of the cases. Further, in several other circuits . . . judges stayed within the federally mandated 
Guidelines less than 50% of the time.”). 
 227. See Sanders, supra note 142, at 145 (distinguishing between “proposals . . . that would 
restrict juries to a range of general damage amounts and those that only wish to give juries 
guidance without any real constraint on their ultimate decision”); see also Joseph Sanders, Why 
Do Proposals Designed To Control Variability in General Damages (Generally) Fall on Deaf 
Ears? (And Why This Is Too Bad), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 489, 496–507 (2006) (summarizing various 
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CONCLUSION 
One of the defining characteristics of the justice system is that its outputs are 
frequently expressed in numbers. The amount of bail to be posted to obtain pretrial 
release, the length of a sentence to be served, the amount of compensatory or 
exemplary damages to be paid—all require quantification. Sometimes determining 
the right number is easy, such as when there is a fixed bail schedule, a precisely 
prescribed sentence, a liquidated damages clause, or a claim for medical expenses 
that can be calculated by simply tallying the doctors’ bills. In an appreciable 
percentage of cases, however, quantification is necessary, but not so simple. This is 
the realm—the amount of damages for pain and suffering, the duration of discretionary 
sentences, and so on—in which anchors can and, as we have shown, do have a 
distorting, and sometimes dramatic, impact. Because anchoring is a powerful 
phenomenon, reducing its influence will not be easy. Although we have experimented 
with debiasing techniques, we have yet to find one that is unqualifiedly successful. 
As we have previously suggested, the only reliable solution might be to confine 
judicial discretion with relatively tight sentencing guidelines and workers’ 
compensation-like damages schedules.228 Of course, adopting such solutions entails 
costs. The solutions would reduce individualization229 and could prove dispiriting to 
judges who might feel that they have been relegated to serving as calculating 
machines. Is defeating anchoring worth the costs of adopting such measures? That is 
a question policymakers should consider if they want to avoid arbitrariness in judges’ 
criminal sentences and civil damage awards. 
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